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The Sexual Segregation of American Prisons'
Despite recurrent interest in both penal reform and women's rights,
little attention has been given to the differential treatment of male
and female inmates in American prisons.1 This Note examines those
differences and assesses their constitutionality in light of the Four-
teenth and proposed Equal Rights Amendments.2
0 The research for this Note was financed by a Travel and Study Grant from the
Ford Foundation.
1. For example, THE PRESDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW NFORCE.IENT AND ADMIMSnRA-
TION OF JusrncE, TASK FORCE REPoRT CoRRicoNs (1967) overlooked female institutions
almost entirely. Walter Reckless and Barbara Ann Kay did submit a report to the Com.
mission on female delinquency and crime, but it was not included in its final report.
The most recent comprehensive survey of correctional facilities for women is J. LExurn.
KERKER, REFOR.MATORIES FOR WOMEN IN THE UNIrrED STATES (1931). This work has been
updated only by an unpublished dissertation, K. Strickland, Correctional Institutions for
Women in the United States, June, 1967 (Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, avail-
able through University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan). Published works on women's
prisons during the last decade have focused on sociological descriptions of a single in-
stitution. See, e.g., R. GLuLofB.ARUo, SocIETY OF WoML'i: A STUDY OF A WOMEN'S PRLSON
(1966); D. WARD & G. KASSEBUM, WOMEN's PRISON: SEX AND SOCIAL SRucTuRE (1965).
2. Data for this Note was obtained in three ways. First, information on correctional
institutions was solicited from the corrections department of every state and the US.
Bureau of Prisons. Second, personal visits were made to the women's prisons of nine
states (see below) and to the federal correctional institutions at Danbury, Connecticut,
Fort Worth, Texas, Terminal Island, California, and Alderson, West Virginia. All inter-
views took place at the institutions referred to in the interview citation, unless another
location is specified. Finally, fifteen sample states were chosen on the basis of size and
geographic location. Selected institutions in these states were then surveyed through
telephone interviews [hereinafter cited as Survey]. The survey encompassed the following
forty-seven male and fifteen female institutions, which account for approximately thirty
percent of the men and fifty percent of the women incarcerated in prisons throughout
the United States:
State Institution 1971 Population
Alabama Frank Lee Youth Center 60
Atmore Prison Farm 90
Draper Correctional Center 600
Holman Unit 800
t*Juia Tutwiler Prison for Women 120
California State Prison, San Quentin 3624
State Prison, Folsom 2356
California Correctional Institution 1189
California Institution for Men 2899
tCalifornia Institution for Women 739
Connecticut Correctional Institution, Cheshire 332
Correctional Institution, Somers 927
Correctional Institution, Osborn 337
tCorrectional Institution, Niantic 147
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State 1971 Population Institution
Illinois State Penitentiary, Stateville 2516
State Penitentiary, Menard 1492
State Penitentiary, Pontiac 1222
tState Reformatory for Women, Dwight 147
Indiana Indiana State Prison 1850
Indiana State Reformatory 2164
Indiana State Farm 1139
*Indiana Women's Prison 129
Michigan Michigan Reformatory, Ionia 1221
State Prison of Southern Michigan Jackson 410
tODetroit House of Correction 326
Minnesota State Prison 931
State Reformatory 653
tOWomen's Reformatory 55
Mississippi tParchman (male section) 1700
t*Parchman (female section) 50
Missouri State Penitentiary for Men 1600
Training Center for Men 720
Intermediate Reformatory 460
*State Correctional Center for Women 86
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex 974
*State Reformatory for Women 44
New York Elmira Correctional Facility 1075
Green Haven Correctional Facility 2090
Wallkill Correctional Facility 208
Clinton Correctional Facility 2045
t*Bedford Hills Correctional Facility 330(a)
Ohio Marion Correctional Institution 1168
Lebanon Correctional Institution 1368
Chillicothe Correctional Institution 1100
Southern Ohio Correctional Institution 1017(b)
Ohio Reformatory 2241
0Ohio Women's Reformatory 312
Oregon Oregon State Penitentiary 1214
State Correctional Institution 460
t'Women's Correctional Center 63
Pennsylvania Huntingdon Correctional Institution 905
Camp Hill Correctional Institution 1024
Dallas Correctional Institution 588
Graterford Correctional Institution 1616
Rockview Correctional Institution 633
Pittsburgh Correctional Institution 982
Regional Correctional Facility 129
OMuncy Correctional Institution 143
Washington State Reformatory 686
State Penitentiary 1304
Corrections Center, Shelton 193
t*Purdy Treatment Center for Women 104(a)
Source: The American Correctional Association, Directory, Correctional Institutions and
Agencies, 1971 [hereinafter cited as ACA Directory].
tpersonal visits
*women's institutions
(a) Population as of July 18, 1972. The Albion institution was closed and its population
sent to Bedford Hills after the printing of the 1971 ACA Directory. See note 16 infra.
The Purdy institution was constructed after printing.
(b) Population as of March 12, 1973. The Southern Ohio Institution was constructed
after the printing of the 1971 A CA Directory.
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In most respects, each state and the federal government operates
two separate prison systems3-one for men, the other for women.' In
part, the differences between those systems are related to their vastly
different scales. Of the nearly 200,000 inmates in state and federal
prisons, less than 6,000 are women.5 Since neither the states nor tie
federal government have established optimal population levels for
their institutions, prisons which house men tend to have substantially
greater populations than those for women.0 Such size disparities lead
to differences in treatment and to the predictably distinct atmospheres
that characterize large and small institutions.
The fundamental decision to segregate which created these scale dif-
ferences has undoubtedly been based at least in part on stereotypical
assumptions7 about the different security and rehabilitative problems
posed by male and female inmates. Institutions which house members
of only one sex can be structured and operated in accordance with
these perceived differences.8 Segregation also prevents equalizing at
the margin and eliminates pressure for standardized treatment. Scale
differences, in turn, often reinforce this tendency toward sexually
stereotyped prison programs.1 0
I. The Dual System in Operation
A. Differences Caused by Scale
Prison systems reflect scale disparities in two ways: 1) women's in-
3. This Note deals primarily with adult prisons. Jails and juvenile institutions arc
not considered.
4. The Federal Correctional Institution at Fort Worth, Texas is the only truly "in-
tegrated" adult facility in the country. The Pennsylvania women's institution at Muncy,
Survey, supra note 2, and the Massachusetts women's institution at Framingham. N.Y.
Times, April 12, 1973, at 51, col. 1, have begun to take male inmates, but thus far few
men have been admitted. In the few other states where women prisoners are technically
housed in the same institution as male prisoners, they are held in separate units of those
institutions, with little or no mixing of the populations. This is the case, for example,
in Florida, Mississippi, and New Mexico. AGA Directory, supra note 2, at 55-56.
5. In December, 1970, there were 190,794 men and 5,635 women in the nation's cor-
rectional institutions. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSnTIuTONs
FOR ADULT FE.LOxs 6 (Nat. Prisoner Statistics, Bull. No. 47, 1971). The ratio is approxi-
mately thirty-four men to every woman.
6. See note 11 infra.
7. Such stereotyping consists of treating all members of a sex as if they possessed
certain physical or mental attributes perceived, accurately or not, as typical of that sex.
8. See pp. 1239-40 & note 72 infra.
9. Even assuming that most male and female inmates possess different treatment
needs, incarceration in a sexually integrated facility would insure that those few inmates
requiring (or desiring) programs normally offered to the opposite sex would have equal
access to such opportunities.
10. Thus, for example, smaller institutions are more conducive to individualized treat-
ment and private rooms; larger institutions can support a broader range of %ocational
programs and less costly custodial supervision.
1231
The Yale Law Journal
stitutions have smaller populations;"' and 2) there are fewer, and by
necessity more widely separated, institutions for women. 12 These fac-
tors have generated a variety of treatment differentials, particularly
with regard to the remoteness of each institution, the heterogeneity of
its population, and the level of its institutional services.
1. Remoteness
The relatively small number of women's prisons results in what
might be termed a "remoteness" disadvantage. This factor is most
striking in the eight states that do not maintain any institution for the
incarceration of women felons. These states consider it uneconomical
to provide facilities for their relatively small female felon populations
and instead make arrangements with neighboring states to "board"
them.' 3
11. The states in the sample displayed the following population patterns in 1971:
Men's Institutions Women's
State Average Range Institutions
Alabama 447 60 -900 120
California 2337 1037-3624 739
Connecticut 532 332 -927 147
Illinois 1079 180 -2516 147
Indiana 1313 1139-2164 129
Michigan 1287 250 -4150 326
Minnesota 792 653 -931 55
Mississippi 1700 single prison 50
Missouri 927 460 -1600 86
Nebraska 974 single prison 44
New York 1339 408 -2090 330
Ohio 1610 1100-2260 312
Oregon 837 460 -1214 63
Pennsylvania 854 129 -1616 143
Washington 926 597 -1304 104
Source: A CA Directory, supra note 2.
In twelve of the fifteen sample states, the one women's facility has a smaller inmate
population than any of the male institutions in the state. Moreover, in two of the three
exceptions, the smaller male institution houses only youthful offenders. See note 22 infra.
12. The 1971 ACA Directory, supra note 2, lists approximately forty state institutions
for women, approximately 250 for men. Similarly, there are three federal institutions for
adult women, twenty-three for men. See note 14 infra.
13. Idaho sends convicted women to Oregon; New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Ver-
mont incarcerate theirs in Massachusetts; Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming send
theirs to Nebraska. Until recently, South Dakota had also been contracting with Nebraska,
but has now opened its own women's correctional unit at its state Mental Health In-
stitution.
Hawaii provides a striking example of this "boarding out" procedure. Women sen-
tenced to more than two years are sent to mainland prisons (usually in California or
one of the federal institutions). Since men are only sent to the mainland if they have
special security or treatment needs that cannot be met in Hawaii's three men's institu-
tions, this 2,500 mile distance burden falls primarily on female offenders. Interview with
Arthur F. Lykke, Assistant Administrator of the Corrections Division, Hawaii Department
of Social Services and Housing, Aug. 15, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
These problems may become more acute as economic considerations force the con-
solidation of the nation's smaller women's prisons. For example, consideration is presently
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Remoteness is also significant in those states which have more than
one male institution and incarcerate men in the institution nearest
their homes.' 4 In New York, for example, a number of the correctional
facilities house male convicts in their geographical district. No state,
however, operates more than one institution for the incarceration of
women.'8
Some administrators contend that the comparative remoteness of
women's institutions is not completely disadvantageous. They note that
isolation can provide an opportunity for reorientation away from the
inmate's former environment.'7 But most administrators and incarcer-
ated women agree that this theoretical advantage is far outweighed
by the real disadvantages of remoteness.' 8 The woman inmate is nor-
mally farther from her community, family, friends, and attorney than
her male counterpart.' 9 She may experience greater difficulty in keep-
ing track of her family or possessions, in communicating with her law-
yer during any post-conviction legal action, and in gaining access to
her parole board.2 0 She may also be reluctant to participate in a work-
being given to incarcerating all female inmates from the six New England states in a
single institution. working paper submitted by Katherine Stricldand, on file with the
Yale Law Journal. See also note 16 infra.
14. This disadvantage is also present in the District of Columbia and federal systems.
See 118 CoNc. REc. E 6636 (daily ed. May 22, 1972):
Long-term female offenders are housed at the Federal Reformatory at Alderson, West
Virginia, more than 250 miles from their communities and their families. The
overcrowded and understaffed prison at Alderson currently houses approximately 60
District women, about 11% of the inmate population. The warden of Alderson
testified to the Commission that it is virtually impossible to provide adequate re-
habilitative services for the District inmates because they are out of contact with
their families and their home community.
In the federal system, there are only three institutions for adult women: Alderson, West
Virginia, Terminal Island, California, and Fort Worth, Texas; but twenty.three insti-
tutions for adult men. ACA Directory, supra note 2. See notes 27 & 28 infra.
15. Survey, supra note 2. Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and California administrators
also reported that their male convicts are assigned to institutions at least partially
on the basis of geographic location. Id.
16. ACA Directory, supra note 2. For many years New York did maintain female
correctional institutions at both Bedford Hills and Albion, but the Albion facility was
closed recently for economic reasons. Interview with Janice P. Warne, Superintendent,
Bedford Hills Correctional Facility, July 6, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
17. See, e.g., interview with Virginia McLaughlin, Warden, Federal Correctional In-
stitution at Alderson, June 27, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
18. See District of Columbia Commission on the Status of Women, Female Offenders
in the District of Columbia, 1972, reprinted in 118 CoNG. RM c E5535, £5536 (daily ed. May
22, 1972). This point was echoed in the interviews with Warne, supra note 16. and Vir-
ginia Carlson, Superintendent, California Institution for Women, Aug. 9, 1972, on file
with the Yale Law Journal.
19. The remoteness hardship also falls on the family of a convicted female, par-
ticularly on children for whom she may have been the sole suport. See The Women's
Prison Association, A Study in Neglect: A Report on Women Prisoners, Dec. 6, 1972,
at 2, on file with the Yale Law Journal. See also note 16 supra.
20. In Hawaii, for example, the Hawaii Parole Board determines the release date
of women kept on the mainland, but does not give them a parole interview. Hamaii's
male felons incarcerated in one of the Islands' three men's institutions are interviewed.
Interview with Lykke, supra note 13.
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or study-release program, knowing that she probably will be unable to
continue once she is released and returns to her home.21
2. Heterogeneity
Typically, male prisons are "classified, -2 2 with different institutions
for different categories of offender.2 3 By contrast, each state's one fe-
male prison must be responsible for the entire range of female felons
and frequently misdemeanants as well.2 4 Thus, in most states, the in-
mate population at the female institution is more diverse in terms of
offense, sentence, and age than the populations at corresponding male
institutions.2 5
This heterogeneity affects all aspects of institutional life, including
prison programs, security arrangements, and administrative policies.
When a prison's population is homogeneous, it can gear its overall
program to that population's particular rehabilitative needs and secu-
rity requirements. But when the population is diverse, the program
will necessarily be something of a compromise, particularly when re-
sources are limited.26
21. Interviews with Lykke, supra note 13, and Milton Burns, Associate Superintendent,
Purdy Treatment Center for Women, August 17, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
22. Only nine states have only one institution for men: Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho,
Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming. A CA Directory,
supra note 2. Of the remaining states, virtually all classify their institutions according to
various categories of male offenders. These institutions may be divided along geographic
or offender lines, or both. For example, twenty-one states and the District of Columbia
have separate institutions for young or first-time male offenders. ACA Directory, supra
note 2. It is interesting to note that a state with as small a population as Nevada has
both a maximum and medium security prison for men. A CA Directory, sue.ra note 2. at 50.
23. This "sorting" is done by sex-separate classification structures. 'lhat is, different
facilities are maintained for the classification of males and females. In many states
(e.g., Alabama, Illinois, Ohio, and New York) all male admissions go first to a central
"diagnostic center" and from there are assigned to one of the state institutions for men.
The women, however, generally go directly to the women's institutions for classification.
Survey, supra note 2.
24. See ACA Directory, supra note 2. Connecticut provides an extreme example. NI-
antic (the women's prison) is the only state facility for detaining women overnight. Its
population ranges from pre-trial detainees to women serving life terms. Interview with
correctional counselor, Connecticut Correctional Institute, June 7, 1972, on file with
the Yale Law Journal. On the other hand, Connecticut maintains six "Community Cor-
rectional Centers" (jails), three correctional institutions, and a conservation camp for
males. ACA Directory, supra note 2, at 12-13.
Texas provides a good example of the considerable classification advantages enjoyed
by men in the larger states. While there is only one correctional facility for women, the
Texas male prison system includes separate institutions for older first-offenders, recid-
ivists under twenty-five, physically and mentally weak recidivists, and pre-release in-
mates; two institutions primarily for recidivists over twenty-five; a diagnostic institution;
and a treatment center for the physically or mentally handicapped. ACA Directory, supra
note 2, at 83-85.
25. See Strickland, supra note 1, at 81. It is, of course, possible that female offenders
are not as diverse a group as the entire spectrum of male offenders; yet it is clear that
states which segregate their young male first-offenders cannot insure that their cor-
responding female inmates do not come into contact with at least some habitual of-
fenders.
26. In fact, women's prisons typically have fewer program opportunities to offer
their more diverse populations. See pp. 1242-43 infra.
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Only in the federal system is there any attempt to classify female
offenders among different institutions,2  and even there the differen-
tiation is slight as compared to the variety of male prisons available.2
Some female institutions in the larger states, particularly those struc-
tured around the "cottage" system, 20 do attempt some segregation of
offenders, but this is necessarily incomplete.30 The women's prisons
in most smaller states do not make even a superficial attempt at seg-
regating inmates, though the male institutions in the same states often
employ both intra- and inter-institution classifications.3'
A few administrators suggest that population diversity (particularly
with regard to age) may have a stabilizing effect on an institution.3'2
The more common observation, however, is that greater classification
would be preferable, particularly where the young or first-offenders
are concerned.33 The inmates themselves typically agree, claiming that
women's institutions are more effective as schools for crime than re-
27. The federal institution at Fort Worth takes younger, short-term offenders, while
the Alderson and Terminal Island institutions receive the complete range of female
felons. Interview with McLaughlin, supra note 17.
28. The federal system has the following types of male institutions: six peniten-
tiaries (one for younger offenders), two reformatories (both for younger criminals), three
youth centers (one sexually integrated), nine correctional institutions (three for )ounger
felons and misdemeanants), three prison camps, two detention centers, one medical center,
and several community treatment centers. ACA Directory, supra note 2, at 93-101.
29. See pp. 1242-43 infra.
30. At Alderson, for example, some cottages are set aside for young offenders and there
has recently been established a long-term cottage for women serving sentences of ten
years or longer "to give them a sense of home... [and] make them comfortable." Inter-
view with McLaughlin, supra note 17. The Bedford Hills institution in New York the-
oretically has both reformatory and prison sections for its female population. However,
the populations are actually only segregated with respect to sleeping quarters. Interview
with correctional officer, Bedford Hills Correctional Facility, July 18,1972, on file with
the Yale Law Journal. The California Institution for Women does have some segregation
on a first-offender basis, but it is readily admitted that this is only superficial as far
as the actual functioning of the institution is concerned. Interview with Carlson, supra
note 18.
31. For example, the administrator of Oregon's one women's institution admits that
it is impossible to segregate women according to record, offense, age, or other variables
because of the small size of the institution and the limited resources available, with the
result that "in a lot of cases young offenders are easily swa)ed [by older inmates]."
Interview with educational program director, Women's Correctional Center, Aug. 16, 1972,
on file with the Yale Law Journal. Oregon's male penitentiary, on the other hand, has
special segregation and psychiatric units, and younger male offenders go to an entirely
separate institution. Id.
52. Some say it would be good to separate the older from the younger offenders,
but now the young know more about crime and drugs than the older ones. Per-
haps the good of the older women rubs off on the younger .... Older women have
"children" [within the institution] that they keep in line. This is missing in age-
segregated institutions.
Interview with Joan Clark, administrator, Federal Correctional Institution at Terminal
Island, Aug. 7, 1972, on file with the Yale Law journal. The same administrator re-
ferred to those serving long sentences as "community builders" of the institution. Id.
This feeling was echoed, though less forcefully, by the Warden at Alderson, who ad-
mitted that the'e is often "positive interaction between short- and long.term people."
Interview with McLaughlin, supra note 17.
33. See, e.g., interview with staff psychologist, Bedford Hills Correctional Facility,
July 19, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal. See also note 31 supra.
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habilitative centers.34 Others voice concern over the loss of security
inherent in overly-heterogeneous prison communities.3"
3. Institutional Services
Some differences in the level of institutional services also seem to
be primarily the product of the scale variations between male and
female institutions. Two examples are medical and religious services."
In general, male institutions are more likely to have complete hos-
pital and dental facilities than female institutions.37 Male prisons are
also more likely to have a full-time medical staff, usually including
both a physician3" and a dentist.30 Because of these differentials,
women inmates are more likely to go into the community for medical
care. 40 It should be noted, however, that in some states, where the
female institution is near a male institution, medical facilities are
shared. 41
Male prisons are also more likely to have full-time chaplains42 and
occasionally even denominational variety in the available clergy.43 By
contrast, part-time and visiting chaplains typically provide the only
34. See, e.g., interview with inmate, Connecticut Correctional Institution, June 6, 1972,
on file with the Yale Law Journal; interview with inmate, Purdy Treatment Center for
Women, Aug. 17, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal; interview with inmate, Call-
fornia Institution for Women, Aug. 16, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
35. For example, one of the inmates at Washington's Purdy Correctional Institution,
which is run as a minimum security facility despite the fact that it contains all female
felons incarcerated in the state, reports that "there are problems with having an open
campus for everyone. Some women here are dangers to themselves; some are dangers to
the community [inside the institution]." Interview with inmate, Purdy Treatment Center
for Women, Aug. 17, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
36. For a brief discussion of the importance of medical and religious programs and
personnel in prisons, see THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUsTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: COuREarIONs 51-53 (1967).
37. Of the sample prisons, sixty-seven percent of the female institutions categorized
their hospital facilities as "non-existent" or "small," while only twenty.seven percent
of the male institutions so described their medical resources. Survey, supra note 2.
38. Eighty percent of the women's institutions in the sample have no full-time phy-
sician, while only twenty-seven percent of the male institutions are without a full-time
physician. Survey, supra note 2. This pattern also appears to hold in states outside the
sample. See, e.g., Division of Adult Corrections, Action Plan for the Immediate Devel-
opment of an Improved Correctional System in Delaware, April, 1972, at 6-49; Maryland
Division of Correction, Forty-third Report, Fiscal years 1970 and 1971, Oct. 1, 1971;
Tennessee Department of Correction, Annual Report 1970-1971, Dec. 15, 1971.
39. Of the female sample institutions, eighty percent do not have a full-time dentist,
while this is true of only nineteen percent of the male institutions. Survey, supra note 2.
40. This is the pattern in Michigan, Missouri, and Washington. Survey, supra note 2.
41. Of the women's institutions visited, those in Mississippi, New York, Oreg~on and
the federal institution at Terminal Island reported such sharing with male institutions.
42. Forty percent of the female sample institutions have no full-time chaplain as
compared to only nine percent of the male institutions. Survey, supra note 2.
43. Only twenty percent of the women's prisons in the sample have full-time chap-
lains of more than one denomination, while seventy-two percent of the male institutions
have denominational variety in their full-time chaplain staff. Survey, supra note 2.
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formal religious services available in a women's institution."4 This dis-
advantage45 may be quite significant, since chaplains are often an
important source of counseling and a moving force behind prison re-
form.46 Again, it should be noted that female institutions which are
close to male institutions often receive more than the normal allotment
of clergy.47
B. Differences Influenced by Stereotyping
Many of the most important differences between male and female
prisons, while undoubtedly aggravated by scale considerations, are
generated at least in part by legislative and administrative sexual stereo-
typing. Such differential treatment is found in physical surroundings,
recreational facilities, institutional staff, and rehabilitative and indus-
trial programs.
1. Physical Environment
The architecture and security arrangements of women's prisons sug-
gest a greater emphasis on rehabilitation and a lesser concern with cus-
tody than those of men's prisons. Gun towers,4 8 double fences, and con-
crete walls49 are rare in women's institutions. Many are of the campus
or cottage type, with dormitory, vocational training, and dining build-
ings grouped around a central yard.5°
44. Survey, supra note 2. The West Virginia system illustrates the problem: The
male state penitentiary has a full-time chaplain, but at the West Virginia State Prison
for Women, the "religious program is carried out with visiting ministers twice a month,
and residents [who] conduct Sunday School the remainder of the time." West Virginia
Commissioner of Public Institutions, Annual Report, 1970-1971, at 53.
45. It should be noted, however, that in states where the women's institution does
have a full-time chaplain there is an advantage that is likely to cut the other way, since
female prisons are likely to have a better chaplain/inmate ratio. For example, in the
state of Washington the ratio at the female prison at Purdy is 1:150, while at the male
institutions in Walla Walla and Monroe it is 1:652 and 1:343 respectively. Survey, supra
note 2.
46. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Correction, Portrait: 1971.
47. For example, the women's camp at Parchman (the ,Mississippi state penitential))
shares four chaplains with the male population of the adjacent plantation. Survey, supra
note 2.
48. All but two of the forty-seven male institutions in the sample reported gun towers.
while only two of the fifteen female institutions have them. Survey, supra note 2.
49. Half of the male institutions in the sample have stone or concrete walls, while
none of the female institutions have more than a chain-link fence. One-third of the
female institutions reported no perimeter wall at all, while only two of the forty-seven
male prisons made a similar claim. Survey, supra note 2.
50. According to some departments of corrections, women's institutions seem posi-
tively bucolic: "The institution [Virginia State Industrial Farm for Women] commands
a view of some of the most beautiful rolling countryside in central Virginia. The red
brick buildings, trimmed in white, give the appearance of a college campus." Division
of Corrections, Department of Welfare and Institutions, The Judicial Conference of Vir-
ginia, February 9-11, 1972, at 22. South Carolina's Harbison Correctional Institution for
Women was formerly a junior college (Attachment No. 2. to letter from William D.
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The interiors of women's prisons also reflect the societal judgment
that female inmates require more privacy and individuality, but less
security relative to each other and the outside world. For example,
women's sleeping quarters are usually private rooms rather than the
multi-bed barracks or multi-tiered cellblocks typical of male facili-
ties.51 When men are given individual cells, the explanation is usually
the security needs of the institution rather than the privacy needs of
the prisoner.5 2 Reflecting a similar concern for privacy, women's toilet
facilities are usually partitioned, unlike the open latrines of most male
institutions.53 Shower units are also often partitioned or provided with
curtains, while men's showers are usually communal."4
Prison rules frequently reflect the same stereotypes. In many insti-
tutions, women may choose their own bedspreads, furniture covers,
and curtains. Such individual expression is much less frequently per-
mitted in male institutions,55 perhaps in part because men are not
thought to require a "homelike" atmosphere, but also undoubtedly to
facilitate the far more frequent cell searches," a practice which may
itself be induced by sexual stereotyping. Furthermore, inmate uni-
forms, which are almost universally mandated in men's prisons, are
not typically required in women's institutions.57 This difference is
Leeke, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, Aug. 16, 1972, on file with
the Yale Law Journal), and the main building of the West Virginia State Prison for
Women was formerly a resort hotel (West Virginia Commissioner of Public Institutions,
Annual Report for 1970-1971, at 52). Conversely, Connecticut is considering plans to con.
vert its present women's prison into a junior college. Interview with administrator, Col.
necticut Correctional Institution, June 8, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
51. All but three of the fifteen female institutions in the sample house their popu.
lations in private rooms. Only six of the forty-seven male institutions have private rooms
-the overwhelming majority of male inmates are housed in cells or dormitories. Survey,
supra note 2. It should be emphasized that the difference between a private room and
a cell is more than mere nomenclature: Cells are usually constructed with bars on the
windows and doors, are frequently enclosed on one side with a wall consisting only of
bars, and are arranged in tiers. Private rooms have screens rather than bars on windows,
doors made of wood with only a small aperture fQr security checks, and are in most
other respects indistinguishable from college dormitory rooms. See note 50 supra.
This differential between male and female prisons is fully recognized by corrections
officers, who often stress the superiority of the facilities provided for women. See, e.g.,
Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Correction, Portrait: 1971, at 36.
52. Interview with William Nagel, Executive Director, American Foundation Insti.
tute of Corrections, in Philadelphia, Pa., July 11, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
53. Eighty percent of the women's institutions in the sample provide private toilet
facilities for all inmates, while only forty-five percent of the male institutions make
similar provisions. Survey, supra note 2.
54. None of the male institutions in the sample reported private shower facilities;
nine of the fifteen female institutions have them. Survey, supra note 2.
55. All but one of the female institutions in the sample allow inmates to decorate
their living areas, while only thirty-four percent of the male institutions permit such
decoration (another thirty percent allow "limited decoration'). Survey, supra note 2.
56. Interview with Nagel, supra note 52.
57. Only six of the fifteen sample female prisons require women inmates to wear
uniforms, while all but three of the forty-seven male institutions surveyed require In-
mates to wear them. Survey, supra note 2.
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often explained in terms of the greater importance of personal appear-
ance to women. 58
2. Recreational Facilities
Male inmates usually have a considerable advantage in terms of rec-
reational facilities. For example, female institutions seldom have play-
ing fields.59 Where there is a large outdoor area available at a women's
institution, insufficient staff may necessitate only limited use of the
area.60 Similarly, there is apt to be less variety in the recreational pro-
grams of female institutions."' In justifying such disparities, adminis-
trators stress not only problems of scale but also perceived differences
in the recreational needs of men and women. 2 ' It is often argued that
women inmates "just don't need the sort of physical exertion that men
do." 63
In several states, however, women inmates enjoy at least one recre-
ational advantage: They are allowed to make more trips outside the
prison-for movies, bowling, swimming, and athletic events-than are
their male counterparts.0 4 This advantage accrues to women inmates
because they are perceived to be less dangerous and escape-prone, and
because such trips are much easier to manage with the typically smaller
female populations.0 5
58. See, e.g., Interview with Burns, supra note 21:
Dress is pretty important in terms of self respect .... The uniform really knocls
identity .... In terms of identity, personal appearance is more important to women
than to men.
59. The women's institutions in the sample states of Missouri, Nebraska, Nevu York,
and Oregon have only "yards," not playing fields, while all male institutions sur eyed
reported playing fields. Survey, supra note 2. It should be noted, however, that in one
state, Alabama, an administrator remarked, "The women are better off in terms of
recreational areas than almost anywhere else in the [Alabama] system." Interi iew with
John Braddy, Public Relations Director, Alabama State Board of Corrections in Mont.
gomery, Alabama, Aug. 24, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
60. See, e.g., The American Foundation, Inc., Institute of Corrections, Visitation Sum-
maries, Colorado Women's Institution, on file with the Yale Law, Journal.
61. For example, only forty percent of the sample women's prisons hale g)mnasium
facilities, while seventy percent of the men's institutions have them. Scale seems to play
an important role in these statistics, since those women's institutions basing g~mnasium
facilities tended to be the larger ones in the sample. Surrey, supra note 2.
62. See, e.g., interview with correctional counselor, Illinois State Reformatory for
Women, Aug. 31, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal. This staff member remarked
that:
Many people don't realize how impractical certain programs would be .... Outdoor
activities have been tried, but not many signed up .... Unless you have a )oung
group, when women get on toward middle age they like to crochet . . .knit ...
they read, they loaf.., they stay in bed ... but what do housewives on the outside do?
63. Interview with Burns, supra note 21.
64. Survey, supra note 2. Eighty percent of the female institutions, but only seventeen
percent of the male institutions in the sample reported regular use of such trip!. Id.
65. Interviews with Nagel, supra note 52, and Clark, supra note 32.
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3. Institutional Staff
The staff at men's and women's prisons differ both in number and
in their relationship to the inmate populations. First, as Appendix
I indicates, there tend to be more staff members per inmate in female
institutions. 0 An even greater disparity appears when the statistics
on "treatment" personnel (teachers, vocational instructors, counselors)
are compared. 7 It should be noted, however, that while the higher
staff/inmate ratios at women's prisons are most often viewed as advan-
tageous, inmates at some female institutions complain that the more
numerous staff infringe on their privacy.""
This numerical differential, while undoubtedly significant, does
not fully account for the different staff-inmate relationships that char-
acterize men's and women's prisons. Administrators at female insti-
66. In twelve of the fifteen sample states the female institutions have a better staff/
inmate ratio than the average ratio of male institutions in the same state. It is notice-
able that the staff/inmate ratios in smaller male institutions are generally higher than
are the ratios in larger male institutions in the same state, so scale is probably an In-
portant factor. See Appendix I.
67. See Appendix I. Staff expenditures account for more than half of annual op-
erating expenses of many institutions. Survey, supra note 2. Consequently, the better
staff/inmate ratios in women's prisons are reflected in substantially higher annual ex-
penditures per inmate, as shown in the following table:
Annual Expenditure per Inmate
(1971)
State Females Males Females/Males
Alabama $ 3,189 $1,644 1.9
California 6,820 4,862 1.4
Connecticut 9,850 5,278 1.9
Illinois 8,938 5,879 1.5
Indiana 4,273 3,083 1.4
Michigan 4,015 3,336 1.2
Minnesota 8,842 5204 1.7
Mississippi 1,834 1,834 1.0'Missouri 3,111 2,289 1.4
Nebraska 5,053 3,727 1.4
New York 16,193 4,371 3.8
Ohio 5,346 4,862 1.1
Oregon 2,691 5,732 .47
Pennsylvania 10,060 3,285 3.4
Washington 10,306 4,375 2.4
Source: Survey, supra note 2, and materials on file with the Yale Law Journal.
* Mississippi incarcerates its male and female felons in segregated sections of Its single
correctional institution at Parchman. The annual budget for the entire institution Is not
broken down by sex.
68. Residents at the Connecticut and Oregon women's institutions complained of such
"meddling." Interviews with inmate, Connecticut Correctional Institution, June 8, 1972,
and with inmates, Oregon Women's Correctional Center, Aug. 16, 1972, on file with the
Yale Law Journal. See also interview with Margery L. Velimesis, Executive Director,
Pennsylvania Program for Women and Girl Offenders, in Philadelphia, July 11, 1972,
on file with the Yale Law Journal:
There is not as much physical brutality in women's prisons, but psychological
pressures are substituted for this. Whereas in men's prisons there is sometimes one
guard for two hundred inmates, women's prisons have almost too many people
around.
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tutions frequently describe that relationship as "mother-daughter,"
whereas the staff in male prisons usually tend to be more concerned
with rules and order10 Characteristically, the staff at male prisons are
more likely to wear uniforms.7 0
An additional factor bearing on staff-inmate relationships is the
greater sexual integration of the staffs of female institutions.7 1 Wom-
en's prisons have traditionally had some staff integration, with male
correctional officers assigned for security reasons."2 Because of the
stereotype of male prisoners as more dangerous, however, female cor-
rectional officers were rarely assigned to male institutions. Recently,
the administrators of several female institutions have come to see
male staff as beneficial for reasons other than security: There is a
feeling that the institutional atmosphere is more "natural" when
members of both sexes are present as correctional officials." Some
male institutions are also beginning to realize the advantages of
sexually-mixed staffs,74 although they are generally still far behind
in the process of integration.7 5
4. Educational and Vocational Programs
There are some differences in the academic education available to
male and female offenders, although they are not as consistent or
severe as those in other treatment areas. 0 Differences in academic
69. These characteristics were supplied by a psychologist who has worked in both
male and female institutions. Interview with staff psychologist, Bedford Hills Correc-
tional Institution, June 18, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal. See also interview
with Nagel, supra note 52. The large numbers that must be handled at male insti-
tutions is probably an important factor contributing to this philosophy.
70. Guards at ninety-five percent of the sample male institutions are required to
wear uniforms; only forty percent of the female institutions have such a requirement.
Survey, supra note 2.
71. For example, there are five male correctional officers at the Julia Tutwiler
Prison for Women in Alabama, but no female officers in the state's male institutions.
Even more striking, half the staff at Washington's female institution at Purdy is male.
while there are no female correctional officers at the state penitentiary in Walla Walla.
See Appendix L
72. Interview with correctional counselor, Connecticut Correctional Institution, June
8, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
73. As the superintendent of the California Institution for Women put it, "It's 4ood
[for the inmates] to relate to both sexes." Interview with Carlson, supra note 18. rhe
warden at Terminal Island agreed: "I think having men in close proximity is a good
thing ... it's good for the staff to work with male staff . . . it's good for the inmates
... important psychologically." Interview with Clark, supra note 32.
74. The superintendent of the California Institution for Women now complains of
losing staff to the male institutions in that state. Interview with Carlson, supra note 18.
75. An integrated staff, however, need not be utilized in a manner that would in-
fringe the privacy right of inmates. This danger can be easily avoided by providing
that strip searches and shower observation, where necessary, be conducted by officers
of the same sex. See note 157 infra.
76. Among the sample institutions, the following differences were reported: Michigan
does not provide first through eighth grade or study-release educational programs for in-
mates at the Detroit House of Corrections (women), but it does provide such programs
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education generally stem from factors of scale and tend to disad-
vantage female inmates. In a few states, the one women's institution
is considered too small to justify any educational program at all;71
more frequently, a particular program will not be offered at the fe-
male institution but will be available at some of the state's male
prisons.7 8
Substantial differences are also found in prison teaching staffs:
Women's prisons tend to have fewer teachers, but better teacher/
inmate ratios.70 Thus, while the larger number of teachers in men's
prisons permits specialization by both grade level and subject matter,
the better teacher/inmate ratio in women's prisons may permit more
individual attention and assistance.
The influence of sexual stereotypes creates a much greater dis-
parity in vocational training. (See Appendix II.) First, the types of
programs offered at male and female prisons are very different. Men
are usually given programs in mechanical skills and physical labor,
while women are offered training in clerical skills and personal serv-
for male inmates at one of its male prisons; California has no study-release program for
women, but does have such a program at the California Institution for Men: Alabama
provides no college-level courses for women, but does provide such courses at one of
its men's institutions; and Nebraska provides junior college education on a study release
basis for women, but provides a four year college program on the premises of its men's
prison. Survey, supra note 2.
77. See, e.g., Delaware Division of Adult Corrections, An Action Plan for the Im-
mediate Development of an Improved Correctional System in Delaware, April, 1972, at
6-25. 6-30.
78. See note 76 supra. According to state-supplied information on file with the Yale
Law Journal, Alabama, Delaware, Massachusetts, Nevada. Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
and West Virginia do not offer women inmates college level courses, while at least one
of their male prisons do so.
79. The following table indicates the differences in the number of teachers and
the number of inmates per teacher at the sample institutions. It is assumed that part-
time teachers worked half-time.
Women's Institution Men's Institutions
Inmates/ Teachers Inmates/Teacher
State Teachers Teacher Average Range Average
Alabama 2.5 48 2.5 0-4 391
California 7 106 9.5 5-13 295
Connecticut 3.5 42 7 2-9 76
Illinois 6 24 8 3-11 282
Indiana 1 129 12 3-28 109
Michigan 8.5 38 30 28-33 85
Minnesota 1 55 9 7.5-11 88
Mississippi 1 50 4 single prison 425
Missouri 4.5 19 12 9-20 77
Nebraska 3 15 6 single prison 162
New York 12 25 13.5 6-37 121
Ohio 5.5 57 15 8-33 107
Oregon 1 63 8 8 106
Pennsylvania 3 50 13 5-38 107
Washington 12.5 14 13 9-17.5 75
Calculations based on populations listed in ACA Directory, supra note 2, and information
acquired in Survey, supra note 2.
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ices. Second, male prisons consistently offer a far greater variety of
vocational programs.80 This disadvantage for women is compounded
by the fact that male inmates are often assigned to a particular in-
stitution, at least in part, on the basis of their vocational needs.81
Although scale considerations may account for some of these differences,
the fact that even the larger female institutions do not have more
than two or three programs82-and the nature of the programs that
are offered-attest to the influence of sex stereotypes.8 3
5. Industrial Programs
Although both male and female prisons typically have some indus-
try,8- men again enjoy a considerable advantage in both number and
variety. (See Appendix III.) These differences are partially a function
of scale,8 5 but they also clearly reflect various stereotype-induced judg-
ments: that participation in industrial programs is inconsistent with
the rehabilitative function of women's prisons; that women should
not be used as part of a state-created work force; and that women
should not be subject to the form of punishment embodied in certain
prison industries. The relative number of programs available in fe-
male institutions is too small to be explained by scale alone, 0 and
those programs that are offered reflect general societal stereotypes con-
cerning the appropriate work for women.
80. The average number of programs in the sample male prisons is 10.2, while the
average for the female prisons is 2.7. See Appendix II.
81. Most institutions contacted said that where there was more than one men's prison
in the state, offenders were assigned to a specific institution on the basis of some clas-
sification scheme involving, at least partially, the rehabilitative needs of the inmate.
Survey, supra note 2.
82. Although the female institutions in the sample vary in population from forty-four
to 739, see ACA Directory, supra note 2, no institution has less than one program. and
only one has more than three. Survey, supra note 2.
83. See, e.g., Office of Adult Corrections, Department of Social and Health Services
of the State of Washington, Adult Correctional Institutions Education Programs, May
18, 1972. at 3:
Because a large proportion of residents in the institution will be paroled to their
homes as homemakers, and do not necessarily plan to pursue employment careers,
the curriculum is designed to include training which will improve their qualifica-
tions as homemakers and also provide a cultural enrichment opportunity.
The same pamphlet acknowledges that:
For those who do propose to follow careers in the work world, the small population
of the institution makes it difficult to provide a wide range of vocational courses.
Id.84. Fifty-three of the sixty-two sample prisons have at least one prison industry.
85. Scale is probably an important factor in explaining the lack of industries at the
female prisons in Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, and Washington. where the prison
populations are approximately 100 or less. Yet if all the women's prisons in the sample
are compared, it appears that size has relatively little to do with the number of in-
dustries at a female institution: The largest institution (California) and the smallest
(Nebraska) each have only one industry. See Appendix III.
86. The average number of industries in the sample male prisons is 3.2, as compared
to 1.2 for the female prisons. See Appendix III
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C. The Dual System: An Assessment
In sum, male and female inmates face markedly different prison
experiences: Neither has an exclusive claim to "better" treatment.
Women are undoubtedly disadvantaged by the remoteness of their
prisons, the heterogeneity of their populations, and the lower level
of institutional services and rehabilitative programs available to them.
Men are generally disadvantaged by the nature of their physical stir-
roundings, their staff/inmate ratios, and the relatively stricter regime
of their institutions. Finally, many inmates of both sexes are disad-
vantaged by being treated according to stereotypes applied to all the
members of their sex in a segregated correctional system.
II. The Fourteenth Amendment: Modification of the Dual System
Much of the differential treatment of men and women inmates is
probably permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the
Supreme Court has never explicitly considered the issue, its decisions
in other women's rights cases suggest that most of the sexual classi-
fications in prisons today do not violate constitutional standards.87
A. The Rational Basis Test
In Goesaert v. Cleary,88 the first women's rights case to reach the
Supreme Court, the Court employed a "rational basis" test in uphold-
ing a Michigan statute limiting bartending licenses to men. Combin-
ing this limited approach with a reluctance to interfere with state
correctional practices,89 a number of courts in the early twentieth
87. For an assessment of the Equal Protection Clause as a vehicle for asserting
women's rights, see Equal Rights for Women: A Symposium on the Proposed Con.
stitutional Amendment, 6 HARV. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ. Lill. L. REv. 215 (1971); Note, Sex Dis.
crimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARv.
L. REv. 1499 (1971). See generally L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND TiE LAW (1969).
88. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
89. Though the Supreme Court has never considered the differential treatment of
men and women in correctional institutions, its decision in Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208
U.S. 481 (1908) suggested a general hostility toward equal protection challenges In the
area of criminal corrections. In Ughbanks, a male offender was sentenced under .1n
indeterminate sentencing statute which made him ineligible for normal parole. The
Court rejected his claim that this was a denial of equal protection, finding that the
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to limit a state's discretion in correctional
matters. Id. at 487.
Ughbanks was considered representative of the "hands.off" doctrine, which foreclosed
almost all prisoners' rights cases from judicial review until the 1960's. See Comment,
Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review tie Complaints
of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). See also Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954). Courts have justified this doctrine by citing the
separation of powers. See, e.g., United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir.
1965) ("The federal prison system is operated in all its aspects by . . . the executive
branch of the government, and not by the judiciary .... "). They have also pointed
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century rejected equal protection challenges to statutes subjecting men
to fixed sentences but women to indeterminate termsY0 The leading
case is State v. Heitman,91 where in upholding such a scheme, the
Kansas Supreme Court considered at some length the legal and pe-
nological basis for sexual differentials in corrections.2 -
The Heitman court argued simply that since men and women dif-
fer physically and psychologically," and therefore require different
correctional facilities and programs, 04 the rationality of sexual clas-
sifications was "obvious."05 When the next major cluster of equal
protection challenges to sexual correctional classifications reached
the courts in the late sixties, the Heitman rationale, if not its faith
to the lack of judicial experience in penology, (See, e.g., Carothers v. Follette. 314 F.
Supp. 1014, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)) and the fear that judicial efforts to review the treat-
ment of prisoners might lead to burdensome judicial supervision of every aspect of
prison life (see Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
The "hands-off' doctrine has weakened considerably in recent years, as judicial reviiw
of administrative action has broadened. Access to the courts was the first area in which
the hands-off doctrine was rejected. See, e.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). These
cases created precedent for a variety of other prisoners' rights, and also insured access
to the courts for the assertion of these rights. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969) (the right to prepare habeas petitions for other prisoners); Cooper v. Pate. 378
U.S. 546 (1964) (freedom of religion); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968);
Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 900 (19M) (the
right to be free from arbitrary treatment); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (I.D.
Ala. 1966), af'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (the right to be housed in racially
integrated facilities). See generally I & 2 PK-,crtisNG LW INsrrruTE, Puso.RgwN's RiGrTs
(1972).
90. See, e.g., Ex parte Gosselin, 141 Me. 412, 44 A.2d 882 (1945); Platt v. Commonwealth,
256 Mass. 539, 152 N.E. 914 (1926); Ex parte Brady, 116 Ohio St. 512, 157 N.E. 69 (1927);
Ex parte Fenwick, 110 Ohio St. 350, 144 N.E. 269 (1924).
A number of other decisions before 1930 sustained differential treatment of men and
women in correctional contexts. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 178 Iowa 748, 156 NA.. 747
(1916) (criminalizing prostitution for women, but not for men, is valid); In re Dunkerton,
104 Kan. 481, 179 P. 347 (1919) (state provision of separate and less aiversified facilities
for female convicts is permissible); People ex rel. Barone v. Fox, 129 N.Y.S. 6-16 (App.
Div. 1911) (compulsory hospitalization of prostitutes suspected of venereal infection but
not of their male patrons is permissible). But see Morgan v. State, 179 Ind. 300, 101
N.E. 6 (1913) (statute providing for incarceration of men at hospital for the criminally
insane constitutes unreasonable classification since women are not covered by the statute).
91. 105 Kan. 139, 181 P. 630 (1919).
92. The Heitman court hailed the "new penology," which it thought justified the
Kansas scheme. The f'xed sentence given to men was viewed as a "relic of the stone age
of penological theory," while the county jail-to which men were sent-was an "un-
qualifiedly reprobated and repudiated punitive institution . . . tending to moral con-
tamination and induration, rather than to moral upbuilding." 105 Kan. at 144, 181 P.
at 633. Women, perceived as more responsive than men to rehabilitation, were deemed
more suited for the state's industrial farm. At the same time, indeterminate sentences
were seen as necessary so that each woman could proceed toward rehabilitation at her
own pace.
93. "Woman enters spheres of sensation, perception, emotion, desire, knowledge and
experience, of an intensity and of a kind which man cannot know." 105 Kan. at 147,
181 P. at 634.
94. "[T]he result [of the differences between the sexes] is a feminine type radically
different from the masculine type, which demands special consideration in the study
and treatment of nonconformity to law." 105 Kan. at 147, 181 P. at 634.
95. 105 Kan. at 146, 181 P. at 633.
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in the rehabilitative ideal, still seemed to control,00 and the differ-
ential treatment of men and women within prisons has yet to be
held unconstitutional by any court.
B. Emergence of a Stricter Standard of Review
However, since 1968, several state and lower federal courts have
entertained successful challenges to differential sentencing schemes. 7
The two leading cases, Commonwealth v. Daniel"8 and United States
v. York, 99 suggest a stricter standard of review which might be ap-
plicable to all sexual classifications in criminal corrections.
In Daniel, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a statute
which required a judge, in the case of female offenders only, to fix
an indeterminate sentence at the statutory maximum for the par-
ticular offense. However, though the court found that this particular
statute represented an "arbitrary and invidious discrimination,"' 100 it
was unwilling to say that sex was an unreasonable classification for
all purposes:
A classification by sex alone would not, per se, offend the Equal
Protection Clause . . . . For example, there are undoubtedly
significant biological, natural and practical differences between
men and women which would justify, under certain circum-
stances, the establishment of different employment qualification
standards.101
Although the Daniel court thus used the language of the rational
classification test, it was clearly employing a somewhat more rigorous
standard than that of Heitman. The statute under attack in Daniel
embodied the arguably rational judgment that women respond better
96. A series of Maryland decisions, for example, held that the state could exclude
females from its sole facility for defective delinquents. Sas v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp.
389 (D. Md. 1969); Gray v. Director, 245 Md. 80, 224 A.2d 879 (1966); Chambers v. Dl.
rector, 244 Md. 697, 223 A.2d 774 (1966). Similarly, the Oklahoma courts denied several
equal protection challenges to sex differentials in the age limits of juvenile status, finding
that the statute in question was "premised on the demonstrated facts of life ....
Lamb v. State, 475 P.2d 829, 830 (Okla. Grim. App. 1970). See also Wark v. State, 266
A.2d 62 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970) (upholding a statute
which authorized greater penalties for escape from a penal institution for men than for
women); Benson v. State, 488 P.2d 383 (Okla. Grim. App. 1971); Johnson v. State, 476
P.2d 397 (Okla. Grim. App. 1970).
97. See United States ex rel. Sumrell v. York, 288 F. Supp. 955 (D. Conn. 1968); United
States v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Liberti v. York, 28 Conn. Supp. 9, 246
A.2d 106 (1968); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
98. 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
99. 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
100. 430 Pa. at 648, 243 A.2d at 403.
101. 430 Pa. at 649, 243 A.2d at 403.
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to individualized institutions or sentences, yet the Daniel court re-
quired a more cogent showing of rationality.
In York, a federal district court went even further in invalidating
Connecticut's differential sentencing scheme. t02 Although the court
acknowledged that judicial deference to legislative classifications "can
extend to classifications based on sex,"103 it nevertheless subjected
the Connecticut statute to a strict standard of review. 10 York even
went so far as to suggest that all sex classifications should receive
such strict scrutiny:
While the Supreme Court has not explicitly determined whether
equal protection rights of women should be tested by this rigid
standard, it is difficult to find any reason why adult women, as
one of the specific groups that compose humanity, should have
a lesser measure of protection than a racial group.105
The York opinion thus cut through many of the fictions that had
justified sexually different correctional treatment since Heitman. It
required the state to show that its classification was reasonable in
light of its purposes, and this Connecticut was unable to do: It could
not demonstrate that women in fact required longer periods of in-
carceration, nor could it show that there was actually a difference
in the "quality of treatment and conditions of incarceration" at the
women's facility.106
Although York and Daniel probably cannot be read to require strict
scrutiny of all sexual classifications, they do suggest an "intermediate"
standard of review in certain circumstances. The combination of a
marginally suspect sex classification, bolstered perhaps by an unwill-
ingness to accept the grosser sexual stereotypes of Heitman, seems
to have produced a more "active" rational basis test. Such a test re-
fuses to accept a legislative rationale a priori, but rather asks for
substantial and empirically grounded justifications which seem rea-
102. The Connecticut statute at issue in York required an indeterminate sentence
for female offenders with a maximum of three years. A male convicted of the same
offense would receive a maximum sentence of twelve months. Thus, the situation in
York is somewhat different from that of Heitman and Daniel in that in York the dis-
similar treatment was not only with respect to fixed versus indeterminate sentencing,
but also with respect to the maximum possible sentence.
103. 281 F. Supp. at 13.
104. The court declared that the challenged statute must be supported by a "full
measure of justification to overcome the equal protection which is guaranteed.
Id. at 14.
105. Id. at 14. It is unclear whether the court's holding in York represents an ac-
ceptance of this blanket extension of the strict standard, or whether it instead indicates
that the fundamental interests touched by incarceration combined with a ex classifi-
cation warranted such careful scrutiny.
106. Id. at 15.
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sonable'0 7 and which are narrowly drawn to reflect the real-and rele-
vant-differences between men and women.
Recently, the Supreme Court seems to have applied just such an
intermediate test in Reed v. Reed,10 8 where it invalidated an Idaho
statute providing that as between equally qualified estate administra-
tors men must be preferred over women.100 The statutory justifica-
tions advanced by the state in Reed-efficient judicial administration
and the avoidance of intra-family disputes-seem at least as persua-
sive as those in Goesaert.I 10 Yet the Reed Court nevertheless found
them insufficient."1 '
The Court's opinion is, however, quite brief and its reasoning un-
clear. The Court may simply have decided that the statute in question
was not actually conducive to either harmony or efficiency and was
thus not even rationally related to any permissible legislative goal. Or
it may have decided that the means chosen for furthering the state's
goals unnecessarily infringed on the equal treatment of men and
women. Finally, the Court may have found that the goals in Reed,
even if there were no other "less drastic means," were not worth
the resulting sexual discrimination. Whatever the Court's rationale,
it clearly involved closer judicial scrutiny than had previously been
evidenced in women's rights cases.112
107. At least one court has been quite explicit in its use of such a test. In State V.
Costello, 59 N.J. 334, 282 A.2d 748 (1971), the New Jersey Supreme Court considered a
challenge to that state's indeterminate sentencing statute. The court concluded that a
remand was necessary, at which the state would be expected to show, in an adversary
hearing, "substantial justification" for the scheme, "empirically grounded to the greatest
extent possible." 59 N.J. at 346, 282 A.2d at 755. See also Liberti v. York, 28 Conn. Supp.
9, 246 A.2d 106 (1968), where the court, in invalidating a differential sentencing scheme
in Connecticut, said that "factually and statistically, there is no basis" for such dif-
ferential treatment. 28 Conn. Supp. at 10, 246 A.2d at 107.
108. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
109. The Reed Court phrased the question before it in traditional "rational basis"
terms: "whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants for letters of adminis-
tration bears a rational relationship to a State objective that is sought to be advanced."
404 U.S. at 76. After a period of relative quiescence, during which the Court developed
the new doctrines involving "compelling state interests" and "suspect classifications," the
traditional "rational basis" test seems to be enjoying a resurgence. See, e.g., Eisenstadt
v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438. 446-47 (1972) (invalidating a statute prohibiting unmarried per-
sons from obtaining contraceptives); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (up-
holding a maximum welfare grant statute). For a re-evaluation of the traditional ra-
tionality standard in the light of recent decisions, see Note, Legislative Purpose, Ra-
tionality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.l. 123 (1972).
110. See note 88 supra. An intermediate standard seems to have been used in three of
the more recent "bartender" cases. See Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, 317 F.
Snpp. 593, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), which explicitly rejected as inadequate the Goesaert ra-
tionale. See also Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971):
Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Ass'n v. Borough of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 270 A.2d
628 (1970).
111. For discussion and criticism of these and other theories underlying the "ra-
tional basis" test, see Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 YALE L.1. 1205 (1970); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Pro-
tection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
112. See pp. 1244-45 supra.
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C. Application of the Intermediate Standard of Review
There are, of course, some treatment differentials which even a
relatively permissive standard of review would invalidate. A substan-
tial disparity in the basic necessities would be unconstitutional simply
because it would be difficult to find any rational basis for such a
difference. 113 And even those treatment differentials which do have
an arguably rational basis might still be invalidated under an "inter-
mediate" standard of review.
1. Segregated Institutions
The most salient difference in the treatment of men and women
inmates is, of course, that they are treated separately. Significantly,
no court has ever suggested that sexually segregated prison facilities
are unconstitutional; indeed, the York court expressly approved
them..
1 4
An intermediate standard would require some substantial justifi-
cation for the maintenance of segregated institutions. To be sure,
the state might assert its interest in preserving order within prison
facilities: In view of the small number of female inmates, male com-
petition for the attentions of a few women might be a source of ten-
sion, if not violence. Though security interests have been held to be
insufficient to justify the maintenance of racially segregated prison
facilities,115 the greater tolerance of sexual classifications would prob-
113. Courts have recently looked to per capita state expenditure to determine the
existence of discrimination in the provision of government services. See, e.g., Hawkins
v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (1971), aff'd en bane, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 19 72). How-
ever, such analysis would be largely inapplicable in the prison context. First, state budg-
etary provisions with regard to correctional institutions arc by necessity presented in
terms of annual operating expenditures, which do not reveal disparities in capital costs.
See note 67 supra. In light of the great differences in ph)sical plant that typify male
and female institutions, these disparities are probably very significant. See pp. 1237-38
supra. Second, such figures do not take economies of scale into account. Women's prisons
may need a far higher staff/inmate ratio to provide the same level of services available
at the larger male institutions. Third, expenditures alone do not necessarily reflect dif-
ferences in quality and variety, which are particularly important with regard to prison
vocational programs and industries. See p. 1243 supra.
114. United States v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8, 15 (D. Conn. 1968):
There are a number of things that could well be s¢aid in defense of separate insti-
tutions for women ... . There are ample reasons for separate institutions, and the
State may permissibly introduce priorities and co-ordination between them . . ..
The notion of sexually integrated facilities was unthinkable to the Heitman court: It was
"not worthwhile discussing the necessity of preventing promiscuous association of the
sexes in prison. There must be complete segregation." 105 Kan. at 147. 181 P. at 634.
115. In Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), alf'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968),
the court ordered the complete racial integration of the Alabama prison system, including
the maximum security unit, within one year. While recognizing that in some isolated in-
stances prison security and discipline might necessitate racial segregation for a limited
period, the court could not conceive of such consideration requiring complete and per-
manent segregation of the races in all Alabama prison facilities. In McClelland v. Sigler,
456 F.2d 1266 (8th Cir. 1972), the Eighth Circuit rejected similar arguments in ordering
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ably lead to a contrary outcome, unless the new federal experiment 10
with a partially integrated prison undercuts the claim that sexual in-
tegration leads to violence.
The state might also argue that administrative efficiency justifies
segregation. If it could demonstrate that men are generally more
violent or escape-prone, sexual segregation might be the easiest, if
not the most accurate, method of allocating inmates to institutions
with appropriate security arrangements.11 7
Finally, the state might assert its interest in the rehabilitation of
the female inmate population. If the relatively small number of
women prisoners in any one state were divided among the men's in-
stitutions, only a handful would be left within each essentially all-
male institution. The state might well argue that the resulting lack
of female companionship and male orientation of prison programs
would be detrimental to the comfort and rehabilitation of the women
prisoners.
Courts have, in fact, approved such considerations in both the cor-
rectional and educational context, usually holding the sexual separa-
tion to be constitutional unless the facilities available to one sex are
markedly inferior. 18 Thus, the inference drawn from the racial con-
the racial integration of all facilities at the Nebraska Correctional Complex. The court
explained that if violent disruptions occurred, it was the duty of the administrators to
take appropriate action against the offending inmates, black or white. Cf. Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (rejecting the security argument in the context of school inte-
gration).
116. See note 184 infra.
117. This justification was given judicial approval in Wark v. State, 266 A.2d 62,
65 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1970):
[T]here is a validating relationship as between the varying behavioral patterns of
the two sexes and the statutory distinction as between the sexes . . . the legislature
could reasonably conclude that the greater physical strength, aggressiveness and dis-
position toward violent action so frequently displayed by a male prisoner bent on es-
cape from a maximum security institution presents a far greater risk of harm to prison
guards and personnel ... than is the case when escape is undertaken by a woman
confined in an institution designed primarily for reform and rehabilitation.
118. For example, in Chambers v. Director, 244 Md. 697, 223 A.2d 774 (Ct. App.
1966), the Maryland Court of Appeals declared that:
[A]ssuming the state has chosen . . . to exclude [women from its sole facility
for defective delinquents], it cannot be said that this would constitute an improper
exercise of power. We see no reason why the State cannot limit the program to
whichever sex seems immediately to constitute the greater danger to society, pro-
vided the basis for this determination is a reasonable one.
244 Md. at 699-700, 223 A.2d at 776. Considering the same issue three years later, the
U.S. District Court indicated that administrative inconvenience and fiscal economy were
reasonable grounds for excluding women. It was "quite clear," said the court, that the
facility could not "satisfactorily be run as a coeducational institute." Moreover, "the
number of female defective delinquents 'fortunately' is small, and would not justify
building a separate institution for them." Sas v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp. 389, 418 (D. Md,
1969).
See also Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86, 99 (Tex. Crim.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230
(1958), rehearing denied, 359 U.S. 999 (1959) (upholding the exclusion of women from
Texas A & M College, noting that their admission could create "vexing problems"),
Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1970) (upholding a
females-only admissions policy at a state-supported college, in the absence of a showing
1250
The Sexual Segregation of American Prisons
text that separation itself denotes inferiority does not seem to apply
in cases of sexual segregation, and a "separate but equal" system ap-
pears to be permissible 19 under the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. The Remoteness-Heterogeneity Dilemna
As noted above, women's prisons are too few in number to permit
incarceration -near the inmate's home1 20 and are also generally too
small to permit significant internal classification.'- The only satis-
factory method of eliminating such disadvantages-short of sexual in-
tegration-would be to construct small, local women's institutions in
each state equal in number and variety to that of the state's male system.
Support for such equalization may be derived from Commonwealth
v. Stauffer,122 where a Pennsylvania court voided a plan of differen-
tial incarceration-men to jails, women to a penitentiary-for the same
misdemeanor. The court reasoned that mixing first-offender mis-
demeanants with "hardened" criminals amounted to a violation of
equal protection, since similarly situated men faced no such threat.
As men are in most states segregated according to some classification
scheme, women might, in view of Stauffer, claim a right to be simi-
larly classified.1 23 The recognition of such a right without the sexual
integration of prisons is unlikely, however, since few courts would
order a state to expend the millions necessary to provide a full range
of correctional institutions for women.
that the college was more educationally desirable than the state institutions which ad-
mitted males); Kirstein v. Rector and Board of Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp.
184 (E.D. Va. 1970) (three-judge court) (finding that the exclusion of women from the
state's prestige college denied women equal protection, but declining to hold that the
state could not operate any segregated institutions).
119. The continued judicial acceptance of sexually segregated prisons presents two
analytical problems. The first was raised in Wark v. Robbins, 458 F.2d 1295 (1st Cir.
1972) (upholding differential penalties for men and women who escape from prison). The
court noted that because men and women were housed by the state in separate facilities
with different security characteristics, they were not "similarly situated" and therefore
failed to meet the threshold requirement for an equal protection challenge. But see Com.
monwealth v. Stauffer, 214 Pa. Super. 113, 251 A.2d 718 (1969) (differential conditions of
incarceration-men to jail, women to a penitentiary-held unconstitutional).
Second, proof of some kinds of sexual discrimination will be particularly difficult where
the system is segregated, because the court might hesitate to condemn differences which
might be the product of administrative style or penological theory. Since the courts are
unlikely to hold unconstitutional every difference in treatment, they will have to de-
velop standards for distinguishing permissible penological experimentation from illeal
sexual discrimination. For example, a court might consider whether a given differenialcarried with it a c notation of inferiority, whet er it was syst matic and peroaive, and
whether the right at issue was so fundamental that the classifications affecting it de-serve strict scrutiny.
120. See pp. 1232-33 supra.121. See p. 1235 supra.
122. 214 Pa. Super. 113, 251 A2d 718 (1969).
123. Such a right might be derived either from equal protection theory or by ex-
tension from the recognized right to be free from physical harm in prison. Set pp.
1260-61 inra.
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3. Rehabilitative Programs and Personal Services
Scale-generated differences in the treatment of male and female
inmates might be difficult to justify under an intermediate test, since
they result from a state-created system of separate facilities. Clearly,
the "separate but equal" argument will not be successful unless there
is true equality. Yet, the state interest in fiscal economy, when truly
significant, would probably bar the complete equalization of serv-
ices and programs. 2 4
Differentials based on perceived differences in the sexes might also
survive challenge, if they satisfied the closer judicial scrutiny sug-
gested by Reed, York, and Daniel. It is unlikely, however, that any
disparity in the provision of necessities, such as medical or religious
services, could be justified. A severe disparity in treatment personnel
and programs would also probably be unconstitutional, unless the
state could affirmatively establish that women have less need for such
programs. The courts would, however, probably show greater defer-
ence to a defense that the types of vocational and industrial programs
offered should reflect, if not sexual stereotypes themselves, at least
the work preferences and realistic job opportunities that those stereo-
types have engendered in the inmates and the society as a whole.
The precedents in this area suggest the parameters of the problem.
On the one hand, the courts have traditionally granted the state broad
discretion in allocating rehabilitative programs among its various in-
stitutions. Thus far, there'seems to be no constitutional right to any
particular rehabilitative scheme.12 5 The availability of some programs
at some facilities does not appear to produce an obligation to offer
them to all prisoners. In fact, in Wilson v. Kelley,120 a three-judge
federal court rejected just such a contention:
Humane efforts to rehabilitate should riot be discouraged by
holding that every prisoner must be treated exactly alike in this
respect . . . to order the maximum for each and every person
confined, as ordered by plaintiffs here, could be financially pro-
124. Such cases would undoubtedly turn on the size of the financial burden involved
and the importance of the programs or services at stake.
125. Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005, 1012-13 (N.D. Ga. 1968), a! 'd per curian,
393 U.S. 266 (1969). A general lack of rehabilitative programs, when combined with de-
plorable physical and sanitary conditions, led a federal district court to declare the en-
tire Arkansas prison system violative of the Eighth Amendment. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1969). But beyond the rather minimal level required in that
case, there seems to be no constitutional right to rehabilitative programs.
126. 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (three-judge court), afJ'd per curtam, 393
U.S. 266 (1969).
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hibitive for this state and could result in a reduction of re-
habilitative efforts rather than an implementation.' 2 7
On the other hand, such institutional differentiation has been viewed
with closer scrutiny when the classification was sexual in nature. In
Dawson v. Carberry,12 8 female inmates of the San Francisco jail sued
to join a work-furlough program from which they had been excluded.
A federal district court ordered the women included, rejecting the
state's argument that it lacked the resources to build comparable fe-
male facilities and that the smaller number of women did not justify
such an expenditure in any event.
However, despite Dawson, the precedents suggest that an equal
protection challenge must be directed not to the absence or inade-
quacy of any one program, but rather to the overall inferiority of
the programs and services at the female prison. The principle enunci-
ated in school cases, such as Kirstein v. Rector & Board of ViSitors 20
and Williams v. McNair,"3 ° is that the sexes may be segregated, but
that separate must be equal.1 31
D. Reform under the Fourteenth Amendment
The adoption of an intermediate standard of Fourteenth Amend-
ment review would thus render unconstitutional some of the differen-
tial treatment of men and women in American correctional systems,
but it would probably not force the actual integration of those sys-
tems. The most significant changes would undoubtedly come in the
areas of rehabilitative programs and prisoner services, which would
be comparatively inexpensive to equalize. On the other hand, it is
unlikely that the courts would order the substantial expenditures
necessary to standardize prison architecture or to provide a full range
of specialized institutions for the relatively few women prisoners in
each state.
III. The Equal Rights Amendment: Elimination of the Dual System
Although there is thus some possibility of reform under the Four-
teenth Amendment, any substantial movement towards the equal treat-
127. Id. at 1012-13.
128. No. C-71-1916 (N.D. Cal., filed Sept., 1971), cited in Singer. Women in the
Criminal Justice System (unpublished manuscript on file at Yale Law Library.)
129. 509 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) (three-judge court).
130. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970) (three-judge court), alJ'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
131. See p. 1250 & note 118 supra.
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ment of men and women in correctional institutions must await rati-
fication of the proposed "Equal Rights" Amendment, which requires
that:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex. 13 2
The import of this rather ambiguous mandate of "equality" must
be drawn from the Amendment's legislative history'8 3 and the existing
law of equal protection.
A. Interpretation of the Amendment
1. The Absolute Approach
The language of the ERA may be interpreted in three different
ways: (1) that any sexual classification must rest on some "rational"
132. The House approved the ERA by a vote of 354-23. H.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. H 9392 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971). The Senate approved it by a
vote of 84-8. S.J. Res. 122, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. S 4612 (daily ed. March
22, 1972). For a summary of the pre-1971 legislative history of the Amendment, see S.
REP. No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1972) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 92.689J.
The Amendment has now been submitted to the states which have seven years to
ratify. H.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNc. REC. H 9392 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971).
By March 1, 1973, twenty-eight of the required thirty-eight states had ratified the Amend-
ment. Then, on March 15, 1973, Nebraska withdrew its approval, while Connecticut,
which had previously rejected the Amendment, voted to ratify. N.Y. Times, March 16,
1973, at 1, col. 8. The effect of these two turnabouts is not entirely clear. The Supreme
Court has followed a policy of non-intervention in the ratification process, declaring that
the issue of vote changes is a "political question" for Congress and the Secretary of State.
See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). Although a number of recent cases have nar-
rowed the political question doctrine, they have cited Coleman with approval. See
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1961).
Congress has only been faced once with crucial changes in both directions. During
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Ohio and New Jersey first ratified and then
withdrew their consent; North and South Carolina switched from rejection to ratifica-
tion. The Secretary of State submitted the problem to Congress, which chose to include
all four states among the twenty-eight affirmative votes required for ratification. Sec
Coleman v. Miller, supra, at 448-49. Subsequent action by Congress and the Executive
reinforces the view that only ratification is final. See Coleman v. Miller, supra, at 436
(Kansas' change to an affirmative vote on the proposed child labor amendment was
accepted); at 449 n.25 (New York's withdrawal of its ratification of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment was rejected); IV. LIVINGSTON, FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 230 (1956)
(Arkansas' switch to ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment and similar changes by
Texas and Idaho with regard to the Twenty-second Amendment were all accepted by
Congress).
This interpretation has also been supported by the commentators on the theory that,
because Article V of the Constitution speaks only of "ratification," only the affirmative
decision to ratify has any binding effect. As a result, a negative vote can always be
changed, but ratification is final and not subject to recission. See J. JAMESON, ON CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING §§ 576.86
(1887); W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 329a (1910).
133. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 23 (1948); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). But see Hearings Before Subcos. 4
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 75-76 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as House Hearings] (remarks of Senator Ervin); 118 CONG. REG. S 4377 (daily ed. March
21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Stennis).
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basis; (2) that any such classification must be justified by some com-
pelling state interest; or (3) that no state interest, no matter how com-
pelling, can justify a sexual classification.
As noted above,134 the first two interpretations are tests the courts
now apply under the Fourteenth Amendment. The third view, first
fully articulated by Professor Thomas Emerson and three law students
in their article, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women,1 35 holds that the law must deal
with the individual attributes of the particular person, rather than
make any broad sexual classifications. Differentiation on account of
sex is thus totally precluded, regardless of whether it is "reasonable,"
beneficial, or justified by "compelling reasons."13°
The ERA's legislative history clearly indicates that Congress adopted
this third, absolute interpretation. The "rational basis" test was re-
peatedly rejected as providing an inadequate check on sexual dis-
crimination. 37 Furthermore, as Senator Ervin explained, it would be
nonsensical for Congress to propose an amendment to accomplish that
which was already the law under the Fourteenth Amendment.""s
Similarly, while Congress never explicitly rejected the "compelling
state interest" test,' 39 it did so implicitly through its clear support
for the absolute interpretation. 40 The Senate Report captured the
essence of the absolute interpretation when it declared that no sexual
134. See pp. 1244-48 supra.
135. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Consti-
tutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
Congresswoman Martha Griffiths, sponsor of the Amendment in the House, sent a copy
of the article to all members of the House, noting, "It will help )-oi understand tie
purposes and effects of the Equal Rights Amendment .... The article explains how
the ERA will work in most areas of the law." See 118 Cox. REc. S 4250 (daily cd.
March 20, 1972). Senator Ervin also characterized the article as "important legislative
history." Id. at S 4264.
136. House Hearings, supra note 133, at 401 (testimony of Professor Emerson). See
also Emerson, In Support of the Equal Rights Amendnent, 6 HARV. COv. Rrs..CIv. Liu.
L. Rv. 225 (1971).
137. See 118 CONc. Rsc. S 4263 (daily ed. 'March 20, 1972) (statement of Professor
Paul Freund); Bayh, The Need for the Equal Rights Amendment, 48 NoME DA.sAn
LAwYER 80 (1972).
138. House Hearings, supra note 133, at 82-83 (testimony of Senator Ervin). Pro-
fessor Paul Freund made a similar observation more than a quarter century ago, inter-
preting an earlier version of the ERA. See Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 Before a Subeom.
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 78-80 (1945). Professor
Freund's analysis was recirculated by opponents of the Amendment. See 118 CoNG. Rec.
S 4263 (daily ed. March 20, 1972).
139. The House indirectly rejected this standard: The "compelling state interest" test
was embodied in the Wiggins Amendment, see H.R. REm. No. 92-359, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (1971) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 92-359], which was rejected by the House.
118 Coxo. Rac. H 9390 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971). See note 142 infra.
140. Even if the "compelling state interest" test were used to implement the ELA.
the practical effect would not differ significantly from use of the absolute rule. A state
interest has only once been found sufficiently "compelling" to justify a classification
along the lines of race or national origin, and then only in the context of national
security in time of war. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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classification would be permitted under the ERA. 41 The Report also
incorporated the "Separate Views" of fourteen members of the House
Judiciary Committee,142 which stated that:
The basic premise of [the proposed Amendment] in its original
form is a simple one. As stated by Professor Thomas Emerson
. . . the original text is based on the fundamental proposition
that sex should not be a factor in determining the legal rights of
women or of men.' 3
The Senate Report characterized these "Separate Views" as stating
"concisely and accurately the understanding of the Amendment ... ,
A further indication of the intent of Congress to pass an "absolute"
amendment 45 may be found in the repeated refusal of both houses
to amend the ERA to add any qualifying or limiting language.' s0
141. The existence of a characteristic found more often in one sex than the other
does not justify legal treatment of all members of the sex different [sic] from all
members of the other sex. The same is true of the functions performed by indi-
viduals. The circumstance, that in our present society members of one sex are
more likely to be engaged in a particular type of activity than members of the other
sex, does not authorize the Government to fix legal rights or obligations on the basis
of membership in one sex. The law may operate by grouping individuals In terms
of existing characteristics or functions but not through a vast overclassification of sex.
S. REP. No. 92-689, supra note 132, at 11-12.
142. The House Judiciary Committee amended the original joint resolution on June
22, 1971, by adding the Wiggins Amendment:
This article shall not impair the validity of any law of the United States which
exempts a person from compulsory military service or any other law of the United
States which reasonably promotes the health and safety of the people.
See H.R. REP. No. 92-359, supra note 139, at 5. Separate views to the subsequent Comn-
mittee report were filed by fourteen representatives; minority views were filed by three.
On October 12, 1971, the House rejected the Wiggins amendment and approved the
resolution in its original form, as advocated by the authors of the "separate views." See
118 CONc. Rac. H 9390 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971).
143. Separate views of fourteen members of the House Judiciary Committee, H.R.
REP. No. 92-359, supra note 139, at 6. See also note 135 supra.
144. S. REP. No. 92-689, supra note 132, at 11.
145. An absolute interpretation would perhaps be unquestioned were it not for com-
ments by Congresswoman Martha Griffiths, a key Amendment supporter. Her position
was that the purpose of the Amendment is to write women into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and SJ. Res. 231, Before The Sen. Conn. on the Ju.
diciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 225 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. House
Hearings, supra note 133, at 51. During the Committee hearings in the House, she had
the following exchange with Congressman Wiggins:
MR. WIGGINS. I think it is important that we sort of nail down the breadth of
this word "Equality." As I understand it from the amendment, it is not absolute but
will admit of rational exception.
MRS. GRIFFITHS: That is right.
House Hearings, supra note 133, at 46.
However, Congresswoman Griffiths' concept of rational exceptions may not in fact
be inconsistent with the absolute approach: She may have been referring to rational
exceptions from the absolute equality called for by the Amendment, not "rational clas.
sifications" as that term is understood in traditional equal protection law. The two ex-
ceptions she listed were unique physical characteristics and privacy, see House Hearings,
supra note 133, at 46, which are the same ones Professor Emerson would incorporate
into the ERA. See pp. 1257-61 infra.
146. Unlike the House Committee, which had adopted the Wiggins Amendment, see
note 142 supra, the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected six proposed amendments prior
to reporting favorably the joint resolution. See S. REP. No. 92-689, supra note 152.
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2. Exceptions
Two of the ERA's leading opponents also went to great lengths
to stress the "absolute" nature of the Amendment. Senator Ervin re-
jected any possibility of a "flexible" interpretation and claimed that
the ERA would make men and women identical legal beings. 14 7 Pro-
fessor Paul Freund similarly characterized the Amendment as a "yard-
stick of absolute equality." 148 However, these fears go beyond the in-
tent of Congress; certain exceptions are, in fact, accommodated by
the ERA.
a. Unique Physical Characteristics
Under Professor Emerson's interpretation, the Amendment would
not prohibit legislation dealing with physical characteristics unique
to one sex. 149 He explains that such legislation is permitted because
Senator Ervin then offered the following qualifying amendments from the floor:.
This article shall not apply to any law prohibiting sexual activity between persons
of the same sex or the marriage of persons of the same sex.
118 CONG. 1tc. S 4372-74 (daily ed. March 21, 1972) (withdrawn by Senator Ervin).
This article shall not impair, however, the validity of any laws of the United States
or any State which exempts women from compulsory military service.
118 CoNG. Rac. S 4374-94 (daily ed. March 21, 1972) (rejected 73-18).
This article shall not impair the validity, however, of any laws of the United States
or any State which exempt women from service in combat units of the Armed Forces.
118 CONG. Rac. S 4395-4409 (daily ed. March 21, 1972) (rejected 71-18), reintroduced and
again rejected, 118 CoNG. Rac. S 4409-28 (daily ed. March 21, 1972) (7511).
This article shall not impair the validity, however, of any laws of the United States
or any State which extend protections or exemptions to women.
118 CONG. Rac. S 4531-37 (daily ed. March 22, 1972) (rejected 77-14).
This article shall not impair the validity, however, of any laws of the United States
or any State which impose upon fathers the responsibility for support of their children.
118 CoNG. REc. S 4545-51 (daily ed. March 22, 1972) (rejected 71-17).
This article shall not impair the validity, however, of any laws of the United States
or any State which secure privacy to men or women, or boys or girls.
118 CONG. Rac. S 4543-45 (daily ed. March 22, 1972) (rejected 79-11). This last amend-
ment was voted down not because Congress wanted to limit the right of privacy but
because it believed that privacy could be balanced against the ERA as originally worded.
See House Hearings, supra note 133, at 403 (testimony of Professor Emerson): 118 Co..
Rac. S 4544-45 (daily ed. March 22, 1972) (remarks of Senators Bayh and Cook). See note
157 infra on the accuracy of this belief.
147. House Hearings, supra note 133, at 82-83.
148. See 118 CONG. REc. S 4263 (daily ed. March 20, 1972).
149. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 135, at 893. See also House
Hearings, supra note 133, at 402, where Professor Emerson explained:
[T]he equal rights amendment does not preclude legislation, or other official ac-
tion, which relates to a physical characteristic unique to one sex. . .. Such legis-
lation does not.., deny equal rights to the other sex. So long as the characteristic
is found in all women and no men, or all men and no women, the law does not
violate the basic principle of the equal rights amendment, for it raises no problem
of ignoring individual characteristics in favor of a prevailing group characteristic
or an average.
Professor Emerson cites the following as laws falling within the exception: laws con-
cerning wet nurses and sperm donors; laws establishing medical leave for childbearing
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it does not deny equal rights to the other sex. This exception is,
however, limited to physical characteristics and does not extend to
psychological differences, since the latter cannot be said with any
assurance to be truly unique to one sex. 110 Moreover, the exception
is to be strictly limited to situations where the legislation is directly
and narrowly related to the characteristic in question.'1 '
Congress clearly intended to include this exception in its inter-
pretation of the ERA. The Senate Report expressly stated that the
Amendment would not prohibit reasonable classifications based on
characteristics unique to one sex,' 5 2 and Congresswoman Griffiths em-
phasized in her testimony that such a characteristic must be physical.'"
b. Collateral Constitutional Rights
Professor Emerson's interpretation also recognizes that the ERA
must be harmonized with other provisions of the Constitution. 114 Two
(but not for childrearing, since both men and women are physically capable of rearing
children); laws punishing forcible rape; and laws relating to the determination of father-
hood. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 135, at 894.
150. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 155, at 893.
151. Professor Emerson suggests six factors to be weighed in determining whether
such relationship exists: (1) the proportion of men or women who actually possess the
characteristic; (2) the relationship between the characteristic and the problem; (3) the
proportion of the problem attributable to the unique physical characteristic; (1) the
proportion of the problem eliminated by the solution; (5) the availability of less drastic
alternatives; (6) the importance of the problem ostensibly being solved, as compared
with the costs of the least drastic solution. Id. at 894-96.
152. The Report explains:
The legal principle underlying the equal rights amendment (H.J. Res. 208) is that
the law must deal with the individual attributes of the particular person and not
with stereotypes of over-classification based on sex. However, the original resolution
does not require that women must be treated in all respects the same as men. "Equali-
ty" does not mean "sameness." As a result, the original resolution would not prohibit
reasonable classifications based on characteristics that are unique to one sex.
S. REP. No. 92-689, supra note 132, at 12.
153. House Hearings, supra note 133, at 40. The concept of "unique physical charac.
teristic" is not new to the law. An analogous concept is found in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970). Title VII of that Act outlaws sexual
discrimination in employment, but is qualified "in those certain instances where religion,
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business enterprise." Section 703 (e), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e) (1970).
The precise meaning of "bona fide occupational qualification" with regards to sex
has not yet been determined. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has
adopted a narrow construction, saying that preference in employment to one sex Is per.
missible only "[w]here it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness,"
as in the case of actors or actresses. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(2) (1972).
154. See Emerson, In Support of the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 HARv. Civ. R'ts..CIv.
L11. L. REv. 225, 231 (1970). Senator Ervin argued that a constitutional amendment In.
validates other constitutional provisions if such provisions are inconsistent with the more
recent amendment. S. REP. No. 92-689, supra note 132, at 46 (Minority Views of Senator
Ervin). The Senator's view may well be correct, btt his further conclusion that the ERA
cannot be reconciled with the right of privacy is untenable. The language of the Amend.
ment itself is extremely vague, and certainly does not expressly amend or repeal the
privacy right. See pp. 1253-54 supra. The courts would therefore have to look to legis.
lative history to determine whether the ERA as interpreted is in conflict with the right
of privacy; they would find that the majority of Congress intended that the Amendment
not deprive any person of his right to privacy. See note 156 infra.
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existing constitutional rights are of special significance to the opera-
tion of prisons: the right of privacy and the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.
Despite claims to the contrary by opponents of the ERA,Ias Con-
gress clearly passed the Amendment in the belief that it would be
balanced against the right of privacy, and that as a result the sleeping
and toilet facilities of public institutions could continue to be sex-
ually segregated. 00 This conclusion is by no means self-evident, since
no court has yet found a right of sexual privacy with regard to such
facilities, much less extended such a right to prisoners. Nevertheless,
the right of an inmate to disrobe and perform personal functions
out of the presence of inmates of the opposite sex is probably in-
ferrable from the reasoning of earlier privacy and prisoners' rights
cases, at least where no legitimate security or rehabilitative interests
dictate to the contrary."' 7
155. Senator Ervin's position is explained in his Senate Minority Report:
I believe that the absolute nature of the Equal Rights Amendment will. without
a doubt, cause all laws and state-sanctioned practices which in an) way differentiate
between men and women to be held unconstitutional. Thus, all laws which separate
men and women, such as separate schools, restrooms, dormitories. prisons, and others
will be stricken. . . The proponents of the ERA Inention that the Constitutional
right to privacy will protect and keep separate items such as public restrooms; how-
ever, this assertion overlooks the basic fact of constitutional law construction: The
most recent constitutional amendment takes precedence over all other sections of
the Constitution with which it is inconsistent. Thus, if the ER. is to be construed
absolutely, as its proponents say, then there can be no exception for elements of
publically imposed sexual segregation on the basis of privacy between muen and women.
S. REP. No. 92-689, supra note 132, at 45-46.
Professor Freund took a similar position. He testified before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee that the strict model of racial equality would require that there be no sewregation
of the sexes in prisons, reform schools, public restrooms, and other public faciities. See
Senate Hearings, supra note 145, at 74. See also Freund, The Equal Rights Anendmnent
is Not the Way, 6 HARV. Civ. Rrs-Ctv. LiB. L. REv. 234-40 (1971).
156. The Senate Report states that the "constitutional right of privacy established
by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut" would permit a separation of the
sexes with respect to such places as public toilets and the sleeping quarters of public
institutions, even after passage of the Amendment. S. REt,. No. 92-GS9, supra note 132.
at 12. The proponents of the ERA also noted the privacy exception throughout the
hearings and floor debate. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. S 4394 (daily ed. March 21, 1972)
(remarks of Senator Gurney); Senate Hearings, supra note 1-15, at 97 (remarks of Senator
Cook); House Hearings, supra note 133, at 40 (remarks of Congresswoman Griffiths), 86.87
(remarks of Congressman Mikva); 118 CoNG. REc. H 9386 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971) (remarks
of Congressman Ashley).
In addition to this constitutional right to privacy, the Senate Report also refers to the
"traditional power of the state to regulate cohabitation and sexual activity by unmarried
persons." S. REP. No. 92-689, supra note 132, at 12. This power, according to the Report.
would permit the state to segregate the sexes with respect to such facilities as sleeping
quarters at coeducational colleges, prison dormitories and military barracks. However. ex-
cept for a few cryptic references during the House Hearings, see, e.g., House Hearings,
supra note 133, at 289-90, 305, there is no other mention of the doctrine in the legis-
lative history. The legal basis for the doctrine, the general police power, is, of course.
as pervasive as any of the reserved powers of the states, but it is not of constitutional
dimension. Consistent interpretation of the ERA requires that no state interest, not e en
under the police power, be allowed to justify a law or regulation containing a sex-based
classification.
157. Congress based this perceived right of sexual privacy on the Supreme Court's
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See note 156 supra. The
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Although there is no discussion of the Eighth Amendment'58 in
the legislative history of the ERA, that constitutional right cannot
be overlooked in an analysis of the rights of prison inmates. The
courts have held that prisoners have an Eighth Amendment right to be
Court has since expanded and clarified the right of privacy, see Roe v, Wade, 93 Sup.
Ct. 705 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), but it has not yet been called
on to determine whether that right encompasses a prisoner's unwillingness to disrobe
or shower in the presence of the opposite sex. The Ninth Circuit, however, has indi.
cated that the unincarcerated person has such a right. In Ford v. Story, 324 F.2d 150
(9th Cir. 1963), in which a police officer photographed the nude body of a rape victim
over her objection and then circulated the photographs among the stationhouse per-
sonnel, that court said:
We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of privacy than the naked body. The
desire to shield one's unclothed figured [sic] from view of strangers, and particu.
larly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and per-
sonal dignity.
Id. at 455. On the nexus between the right of privacy and basic human dignity, see
Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1964); Singer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in the Prison: A
Preliminary Inquiry Concerning Constitutional Aspects of the Degradation Process in
Our Prisons, in 1 PtRAcrIsING LAW INSTITUTE, PRISONER'S RIGHTs 147 (1972).
Of course, prisons are not noted for the degree to which they protect the dignity and
self-respect of their inmates. See Singer, supra, at 149-51. However, elements of personal
freedom which are protected by the Constitution can only be denied to prisoners If
they conflict with compelling security or other penal interests. See Barnett v. Rodgers,
410 F.2d 995, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1969) and cases cited in the last paragraph of note 89
supra; 1 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, PRISONERs RIGHTS 117 (1972); Tucker, Establishing
the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 ST'AN. L. REV.
473, 508-09 (1971). Moreover, constitutional rights may only be abridged if there exist
no less drastic means of satisfying such penal interests. See Barnett v. Rodgers, supra,
at 1003; PRAcTisING LAw INsTITUTE, supra, at 117.
These principles have led one commentator to conclude that a wide variety of current
prison practices violate the inmate's constitutional right of privacy, See Singer, supra.
Whether or not the courts accept this position, they would probably recognize that no
significant prison interest would be served by the sexual integration of institutional living
quarters. On the contrary, security and rehabilitation would probably demand, and the
states would probably so require on their own, the same segregation dictated by the
right of privacy. 'See pp. 1249-50 supra; Barnett v. Rodgers, supra, at 1002: "Treatment
that degrades the inmate, invades his privacy, and frustrates the ability to choose pur-
suits through which he can manifest himself and gain self-respect erodes the very fou--
dations upon which he can prepare for a socially useful life."
Congress therefore could have reasonably found that prisoners retain a right to dil.
robe and perform personal functions out of the presence of inmates of the opposite
sex, and that this right would require the segregation of living quarters in otherwise
integrated institutions. However, even if the courts, as final arbiters of constitutional
interpretation, accept this conclusion, they will find little guidance in the legislative
history concerning the manner in which privacy and the ERA would interact in par.
ticular situations. On the degree to which living quarters would have to be separated,
see note 189 infra.
Concerning the persons affected by the right of privacy, it is interesting to note that
the male institution at San Quentin now employs two female guards, whose duties have
thus far been limited to the gun towers, visiting rooms, and gates. Telephone con-
versation with Lee E. DeBord, Information Officer, California State l'rison at San
Quentin, March 30, 1973. Even this limited use of female guards, who may be called
on to conduct skin searches and oversee showers, is being challenged in court by a
male inmate. N.Y. Times, March 30, 1973, at 33, col. 8. It seems clear that certain
treatment personnel, such as physicians and perhaps even counselors, must be allowed
greater "intimacy" with the prisoner than would be afforded a fellow inmate. Custody
officers appear to fall somewhere between these two extremes on a continuum of per-
missible "invasions." In each case, the court should balance the degree of humiliation
(loss of dignity and thus privacy) involved, the prison's interest in causing that hit.
miliation, and the feasibility of the less drastic method of having same-sex staff conduct
the "invasion" at issue.
158. U.S. CONsv. amend. VIII.
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free from physical abuse at the hands of both state officials', and fel-
low prisoners. 60 The latter right stems from the affirmative duty of
prison officials to minimize violence among inmates.'" Such con-
stitutional principles must also be accommodated within the frame-
work of the ERA.
B. Problems of Application
1. Would "Separate but Equal" Treatment Be Permitted Under the
ERA?
In Brown v. Board of Education,"2 the Supreme Court invalidated
the doctrine of "separate but equal" in the racial context on the
grounds that separate, by its very nature, could not be equal. As
noted above, however, the Court has not yet made the same deter-
mination concerning sexual segregation; nevertheless, the ERA would
appear to compel such a result.0 3
The framework developed by Professor Emerson simply does not
159. Wiltsie v. California Dept. of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515 (9tl Cir. 1968) (beating
with fists and billy clubs); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968), modifying
268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (whipping with strap).
160. Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971); Cates v. Collier, 349
F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). afl'd,
442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). It should be noted that both Kish and Halt dealt in part
with claims of homosexual rape, a problem analogous to that of sexual assault in in-
tegrated institutions.
161. In Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), a federal district court
held that a wide range of practices and conditions at the Mississippi State Penitentiary
constituted a deprivation of Eighth Amendment rights. The court held that the inmates
had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because of the failure of penitentiary
officials to provide adequate protection against physical assaults, abuses, indignities, and
cruelties by other inmates, by placing excessive numbers of inmates in barracks without
adequate classification or supervision, and by assigning custodial responsibility to in-
competent and untrained inmates. Accord, Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.M. Ark.
1970), afrd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
162. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
163. A "freedom of choice" arrangement cannot be so easily rejected. In the context
of school segregation, the Supreme Court refused to accept a freedom of choice plan.
but only because in the instant case such plans had failed to "effectuate conversion of a
state-imposed dual system to a unitary, nonracial system." Green v. County School Board,
391 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1968). Arguably, a state would not be discriminating against either
sex if it maintained three equally desirable institutions-one for men, one for women.
and one mixed-and gave each inmate the choice of incarceration in an integrated or a
segregated institution.
Such an arrangement would, however, be both doctrinally and practically unacceptable.
While the Court in Green conceded the theoretical legality of "freedom of choice" plans,
it was referring to a system in which each pupil could select among all institutions in
the district. The designation of one institution as "male" and another as "femnale" must
be seen as inherently inimical to the "unitary" system envisioned in Greets, and would
also appear to be a sexual classification at odds with the basic principle of the EIL\.
Furthermore, the single-sex prisons would have to be equally desirable to afford each
sex an "equal" choice, and the integrated prison would have to be at least as desirable
to insure that the state was not covertly encouraging segregation. The cost of maintaining
such "equal" institutions would undoubtedly deter all but the largest states, which
would also probably be deterred by the degree to which such a tripartite system would
limit the geographic and rehabilitative classification of inmates.
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accommodate a "separate but equal" approach, since that doctrine,
just as in the case of race, could be used to keep one sex in a sub-
ordinate position.0 4 Although there has not been extensive study in
the area, the existing evidence does tend to show that sexually separate
facilities are rarely equal.'0 5
Although most of the debate before Congress concerning sexual
segregation dealt with schools,1'0 there is evidence that Congress con-
templated and, by its refusal to revise the ERA, intended that the
Amendment would require sexual integration of all public institu-
tions, including prisons.1 7 The constitutional exceptions described
above would not bar such integration: Privacy does not require the
segregation of entire institutions,"0 8 and the right to be secure from
physical abuse can also be accommodated, as has been required in
the racial context, 69 in far less drastic ways.
2. Equalization Up or Down?
Having established that integrated facilities would be required by
the ERA, the question becomes whether the conditions of the inte-
164. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 135, at 902-03.
165. See pp. 1231-43 supra. An analysis of coordinate "brother-sister" colieges reveals
similar findings. See C. JENCKS & D. REISMAN, TnE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION 305 (1968). See
also House Hearings, supra note 133, at 272 (remarks of Dr. Bernice 
Sandier).
166. Congresswoman Martha Griffiths totally rejected the notion of "separate but
equal" in this context. House Hearings, supra note 133, at 47.
167. Congressman Edwards questioned then Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist as
to whether the various correctional institutions throughout the country would have to
be integrated if the ERA were enacted. Mr. Rehnquist replied that the requirement of
integration would be "a very permissible interpretation." House Hearings, supra note
133, at 3220. In a subsequent letter to Congressman Edwards, Mr. Rehnqulist qualified
his testimony by explaining that the question could not be fully answered with any
certainty:
[A]t a minimum it would appear permissible under the proposed amendment to
separate men and women to the extent necessary to prevent further crimes, such as
rape and prostitution, as male prisoners are now to some degree separated to pre-
vent homosexual assaults. It has been further suggested by supporters of the amend.
ment that separation would be permissible to the extent necessary to protect a co11-
peting right of privacy. To what extent recognition of the necessity of some degree
of separation of some prisoners could be generalized to permit separation of all
prisoners or maintenance of separate systems is, we believe, uncertain.
Letter reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 133, at 329.
Professor Philip Kurland, an opponent of the ERA, testified that the Amendment
would make it unconstitutional for the federal government or state governments to main-
tain separate prisons for men and women and separate reformatories for boys and girls.
See Senate Hearings, supra note 145, at 99. However, Professor Kurland also noted that
there are some, albeit old fashioned, notions of privacy that might properly justify a
policy of "separate but equal" facilities. See 118 CONG. REC. S 4570 (daily ed. March 22,
1972).
Congressman Edwards noted that the Director of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons responded
very affirmatively to a question concerning the possible integration of prisons under the
Amendment. The Director felt that the prisons should be integrated now-"for good
penology, good corrections and decent living .... House Hearings, supra note 133,
at 306.
168. House Hearings, supra note 133., at 402 (testimony of Professor Emerson). See
note 189 infra.
169. See note 115 supra.
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grated facilities would reflect an equalization up to or down from
the best of the present institutions. As a matter of constitutional law,
the courts, when dealing with an underinclusive discriminatory law
or practice, can select either remedy. As Justice Harlan explained,
Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion there
exist two remedial alternatives: a court may either declare it a
nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that
the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the cover-
age of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by exclu-
sion.170
Under the ERA, Congress clearly intended that benefits be extended
whenever possible. The Senate Report states that "those laws which
provide a meaningful protection would be expanded to include both
men and women."'' 1 A similar procedure has already been required
in the areas of employment discrimination 7 2 and the equalization
of other personal benefits. 7 3
In the prison context, however, a problem arises from the great
numerical disparity between male and female inmates. If men are
found to be receiving special benefits or better treatment, it seems
rather clear that both theoretically and practically the proper remedy
would be to extend those benefits to all inmates, including the rela-
tively few women, in the new coeducational institutions. But the
converse situation is somewhat more difficult: An extension of bene-
fits now enjoyed by the female inmate population to the far larger
male population might well put an enormous economic burden on
the states, 74 and it seems unlikely that the courts would mandate
170. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (concurring) (footnote omitted).
See also Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1943); lowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v.
Bennett, 284 U.S. 239. 247 (1931).
.171. S. REP. No. 92-689, supra note 132, at 15-16. Congresswoman Griffiths also ar-
gued that many laws which treat men and women differently would not be invalidated,
but would be expanded so as to include the previously disadvantaged sex:
Under the equal rights amendment courts would follow this established pro-
cedure of invalidating only that part of a statute which offends the Constitution.
while allowing the statute to stand as modified. . . . Minimum wage laws which
cover only women would be expanded to apply also to men.
House Hearings, supra note 133, at 40-41.
172. See, e.g., Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays, 318 F. Stipp. 1368 (F.D. Ark. 1970). in-
volving a state statute requiring overtime pay for women. When the male workers sied
for equal treatment, Potlatch sought to have the state law nullified. The court ruled
instead that the overtime benefits must be extended to men. See also Bowve v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
173. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (wrongful death benefits extended
to previously excluded illegitimate children); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 US. 629 (1950) and
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (access to institutions of
higher education extended to include previously excluded classes). See generally L
KANOwnTL, WOMEN AND THE LAw: THE UNFINISHED REVOLuTION (1969).
174. As noted above, see note 113 supra, annual state budgets may not really reflect
the magnitude of this burden, since they do not reveal the capital expenditure differen-
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such a remedy. Yet since the ERA would require a program of equali-
zation-whether it be up or down-the states and the courts would
probably have to compromise in adapting the old male prisons to
the needs of coeducation, equalizing up where feasible and down
where necessary. The "better" female institutions would, of course,
still be available, to be used perhaps as minimum security facilities
for inmates of both sexes.
C. The Sexually Integrated Institution
Thus, ratification of the ERA would require sexually integrated
prisons which incorporate, wherever feasible, the best aspects of the
previously segregated institutions. Such a system would dictate changes
in many aspects of prison life and administration.
Obviously, those treatment differences which result from economies
of scale' 75 would be eliminated automatically by the integration of
the institutions. For example, men and women would have equal access
to the medical facilities and religious programs provided at a par-
ticular institution.1 6 The problem of remoteness would be similarly
eliminated: While a given facility might still be remotely situated, the
men and women sent there would be equally disadvantaged. Many
other problems would not, however, be solved by the simple act of
integration.
1. The Classification Process
Where a state maintains only one institution for all male offenders
and none for its female felons, 177 the process of integration would
be relatively straightforward: All offenders would be housed in that
one institution. However, in those states where different institutions
are presently set aside for different categories of male offenders, the
classification process would have to be revised to accommodate women
on an equal basis.' 78 The ERA would require that the classification
tial which originally went into providing women with "campus" facilitics while creating
fortresses for the incarceration of men. If the states were required to provide men as
well as women with private rooms and other amenities in facilities which still meet
perceived security needs, the cost might well be insuperable.
175. See pp. 1231-37 & note 174 supra.
176. The enormous costs involved in providing medical facilities would probably make
it impractical for the state governments to equalize medical treatment in all institutions
up to the highest level which is now available anywhere in the system. But if a partlcu.
lar institution were too small to support an elaborate medical facility, there would be
no sex-based inequality. Rather, the men and women in it would be equally deprived.
177. See notes 11 and 22 supra.
178. A sexual integration plan which merely allocated women proportionately through-
out the system would be unacceptable. Under the ERA, men and women would have to
be treated equally; the classification standards which exist for men would have to be
applied to women as well.
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standards employed be objective and sexually neutral in both appli-
cation and effect.Y79
Because of the vastly greater number of men sentenced to confine-
ment,8 0 the application of a sexually-neutral classification scheme
would raise certain problems. There is some'danger that application
of such a sexually neutral scheme would result in grossly unequal
treatment for some women. For example, in a particular state system,
a female inmate might find herself one of only two or three women
in an "integrated" population with hundreds of men.' 8 ' Such gross
numerical disparity may run afoul of the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment,8 2 the inmate's right
of privacy, 8 3 and her right to equal protection of the laws.8 4 Bal-
ancing these rights in urgent situations, the courts might allow a
woman to choose not to be confined in a particular institution. In-
carcerating at least five or ten women in each institution should,
however, provide sufficient same-sex companionship without signif-
icantly hindering the process of integration.
179. 'For example, acceptable standards would include nature of crime, length of
sentence, region of the state, and age. Psychological factors could also be taken into
account, so long as they were determined on the basis of demonstrably objective, sex-
neutral tests administered to the individual inmate. The use of subjective judgments
or stereotyped classifications concerning an entire sex group would be unacceptable be-
cause of the danger of reintroducing sex-based classifications into the system. For ex-
ample, female inmates as a group are frequently characterized as "less violent." .less
dangerous," and "less prone to escape" than their male counterparts. See, e.g., Wark v.
State, 266 A.2d 62 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970). A classi-
fication scheme based on such generalizations could conceivably result in classification
of all females as "minimum security" risks without reference to their individual charac-
teristics. Under the ERA, the only legitimate question would be whether each individual
woman belonged in minimum security. The ERA would thus mandate what modem
penology requires-individual classification. See generally 0. GinoNs, Cit AxxGO TmtE LAW-
BREAKER (1965).
180. See note 5 supra.
181. The state of Hawaii, for example, had only four women and approximately
260 men sentenced to confinement as of the summer of 1972. Interview with L)kke,
supra note 13.
182. Deprivation of same-sex companionship during the entire period of incarcera-
tion and of all companionship during those periods in which privacy considerations
demand sexual segregation, see p. 1266 infra, might be held to be a violation of the
Eighth Amendment, since it would be arbitrarily imposed on female inmates because of
their sex. Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Trop v. Dulles, 356 US. 86 (1958).
183. See p. 1259 supra.
184. Within a sexually integrated institution, women would represent not merely a
minority group, but a minority which had been set apart for certain purposes, e.g.,
sleeping and showering. This differentiation might give rise to special needs, see note
182 supra, the recognition of which would be justified in order to guarantee the "equal
treatment" of this minority group. Racial minorities with needs arising from their par-
ticular religious beliefs have been granted similar special treatment. See, e.g., Barnett
v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (prison administration must have "compelling
justifications" for denying to Black Muslims meals that comport with their dietary
creed).
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2. The Physical Environment
In terms of physical facilities and the general prison environment,
most women now receive better treatment than their male counter-
parts1a5 The ERA would eliminate this differential by subjecting
both men and women to the same physical surroundings in sexually
integrated institutions. Ideally, the equalization would be up to the
level presently enjoyed by the women. But in most states, this would
require either renovation of almost all existing male institutions or
the construction of all new facilities designed to meet the high stand-
ards now found in most female prisons. Again, if the state faces an
economic roadblock to equalizing up, the ERA would tolerate equali-
zation down to a lower, more economically feasible level.180
As discussed above, sexual integration of the nation's correctional
institutions need not result in heterosexual cohabitation, since the
constitutional right to individual privacy'8 7 would probably require
the authorities to provide sexually separate facilities for disrobing,
sleeping, and performing personal functions. 88 Although the degree
to which these facilities would have to be separated in order to meet
constitutional requirements is not precisely defined, a state would
probably be permitted to look to "societal mores" in interpreting
the right of privacy in public institutions. 18
185. See pp. 1237-38 supra.
186. See p. 1263 supra.
187. See notes 156-57 supra.
188. Because privacy is an individual right, difficulties might arise should some In.
mates wish to waive it. Congress did not adequately address the problem of waiver un.
der the ERA; the only specific discussion of the matter was a dialogue betwccn Congress-
man Wiggins and Professor Emerson during the House Hearings. See House Hearings,
supra note 133, at 403-05. However, Congress undoubtedly did not intend to sanction
heterosexual cohabitation and had assumed that the privacy exception would cover it.
See note 156 supra.
In practice, that assumption would probably be borne out. First, even an effective
waiver would not necessarily result in cohabitation. There is, of course, no right to
cohabit with the opposite sex. Rather, waiver would at most force tile state to assign
the sleeping quarters of those who waive on a random basis. Moreover, it is possible
that rights such as privacy which must be enforced through a state administrative
mechanism cannot be waived on an individual basis. Arguably, this justification for
barring waiver is particularly compelling in the prison context, because of the degree
to which administrative decisions are tied to security needs and the difficulty of de-
termining the voluntariness of a waiver in a coercive prison atmosphere.
If waiver should be permitted, sex offenders would not be permitted to opt for
cohabitation with the opposite sex, since the state's decision to segregate in that In.
stance is based on the offense and not on any sexual classification.
189. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 135, at 902. See also House
Hearings, supra note 133, at 46 (remarks of Congressman Wiggins). Although the use
of societal mores to define the new privacy right has never been expressly approved
by the Court, both Justice Goldberg, concurring in Griswold, and Justice Stewart, con-
curring in Roe, noted the changing traditions and concepts of society in developing the
constitutional right of privacy from, respectively, the Ninth and Fourteenth Amend.
ments. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct.
705, 735 (1973). It thus does not seem unreasonable to conclude that Congress and ul-
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3. Rehabilitation
Under the ERA, the current disparity in both the quantity and
quality of rehabilitative programs available to men and womenlao
would have to be eliminated. Since the ERA also requires the inte-
gration of institutions, however, such equalization should create no
significant economic costs. The Amendment would not require that
every institution in a state offer identical rehabilitative programs, but
rather only that both sexes within any given institution be provided
equal access to all programs within that institution. 0' Assignments to
prison industries and other work details would also have to be made
on a sexually neutral basis.'9 2
IV. Conclusion
Patterns of sexual discrimination exist throughout the prison sys-
tems of the United States. Every state exhibits differences related to
both scale and sexual stereotypes in the treatment of its male and
female offenders. The discrimination involved in differential treat-
timately the courts, in giving content to that right, will look in part to current social
mores.
In prisons, separate cells or sleeping units for the sexes would seem to be a necessity
under prevailing social mores. Whether or not these separate units would ha, e to be
physically remote from those of the other sex would probably be an appropriate in-
quiry for the legislature or prison administration. However, the ultimate decision on
such questions of privacy would be constitutional ones reviewable by the courts. See
House Hearings, supra note 133, at 403 (testimony of Professor Emerson).
The institutions which are presently sexually integrated provide some indication of
the existing mores in this area. For example, the Pennsylvania State Prison at Muncy,
formerly all female, now houses a few men. According to the warden, the only facilities
which remain segregated are the sleeping, shower, and toilet facilities. The prison is
of the cottage type and the men reside in their own cottage. Surve, supra note 2. A
similar arrangement has been adopted at the Fort Worth federal facility, N.Y. Times,
July 8, 1972, at 27, col. 1, and the newly integrated institution at Framingham, Massa-
chusetts, Hartford Courant, April 12, 1973, at 7, col. 2.
190. See pp. 124143 supra.
191. Physical integration of the institutions would not necessarily guarantee equal
access. For example, the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman is physically inte-
grated to the extent that men and women are housed in the same geographic area.
However, the women are not permitted to participate in the variety of roational pro.
grams that are available to the men. Interview with Sgt. David Jones, Mississippi State
Penitentiary, Aug. 23, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
192. The relatively small number of women in each state's prison s)stem should not
pose a serious problem in this process of equalization. Even the present all-male in-
stitutions usually offer a variety of female-stereotyped programs and industries. see Ap-
pendices II and II, so women who preferred such activities would probably still find
them available in the sexually integrated facilities. In addition, a deliberate attempt
by prison administrators to disproportionately satisfy male preferences and slight fe-
male preferences would constitute an impermissible sex-based classification. See Jackson
v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968) (prison officials, in selecting appropriate read-
ing material for inmates, could not arbitrarily screen out the preferences of black
prisoners).
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ment varies considerably, but substantial discrimination against both
men and women is widespread.
The Fourteenth Amendment has had little impact on the elimina-
tion of these patterns of sexual discrimination, and does not seem
likely to bring about significant reform. But ratification of the pro-
posed Equal Rights Amendment should require that, within certain
constitutional limitations, the nation's prisons be integrated so as to
insure equality of treatment for both men and women inmates.
APPENDIX I
No. of inmates/ No. of inmates/
No. of staff No. of CO'st
Female Male Female Male
prison prisons prison prisons
2.6 5.8 3.8 8.1
2.0 4.8 5.1 8.7
1A 2.3 1A 3.3
1A 3.1 2.7 4.9
1.7 4.6 3.4 7.1
3.2 4.1 3.8 6.8
1.0 2.2 1.8 4.6
7.4 7.4 11.5 11.5
2.4 3.6 2.8 6.1
1A 2.6 2.8 4.4
1.0 2.9 2.1 4.7
1.4 3.0 4.0 5.0
3.7 2.8 5.7 5.7
1.4 2.8 2.8 4.4
1.0 2.7 1.7 4.6




















Source: ACA Directory, supra note 2, and Survey, supra note 2. Where state has more
than one male prison, figures represent the average for those prisons.
t Correctional Officers.
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